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CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN TAXATION: DECEIT, DETERRENCE, AND THE
SELF-ADJUSTING PENALTY
Alex Raskolnikov*
Avoidance and evasion continue to frustrate the government’s efforts to
collect much needed tax revenues. This article articulates one of the reasons
for this lack of success and proposes a new type of penalty that would
strengthen tax enforcement while improving efficiency. The economic
analysis of deterrence suggests that rational taxpayers choose among
various avoidance or evasion strategies that are subject to identical statutory
sanctions those that are more difficult for the government to find. I argue
that many taxpayers do just that. Because probability of detection varies
dramatically among different items on a tax return while nominal penalties
do not take likelihood of detection into account, expected penalties for
inconspicuous noncompliance are particularly low. Adjusting existing
penalties will not solve the problem because what is (and is not)
inconspicuous depends on a given tax return and, therefore, is not
susceptible to the type of generalization on which the current penalties rely.
I propose to complement the existing sanctions with a new penalty equal to a
fraction of the legitimate subtraction item (such as a deduction, credit, or
loss) reported on the same line of a return that contains the illegitimate one.
With this penalty in place, the harder it is for the government to find a given
avoidance transaction, the higher is the statutory sanction if the transaction
is detected. The proposed penalty adjusts itself. As a result, the differences
in expected penalties for many forms of avoidance and, to a lesser extent,
evasion are reduced, the inefficient incentive to hide noncompliance is
diminished, and the overall deterrence is improved.
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I. Introduction
One (and, perhaps, the only) good thing about tax avoidance is that it unites theoreticallyinclined academics, hard-nosed practitioners, and result-oriented government officials like few
other issues do. Virtually all of them believe that there is too much tax avoidance today.1
Agreeing on what should be done about this is another matter.
This article makes two contributions to the tax avoidance debate. First, it identifies a
significant weakness of the existing tax enforcement regime. Second, it sketches several potential
responses, focusing in particular on a penalty of a new type. The analysis and proposal are
grounded in the economic approach to deterrence. In its most basic form, this approach suggests
that taxpayers contemplating whether or not to engage in tax avoidance take into account
expected rather than nominal penalties. That is, they discount nominal penalties set forth in the
Internal Revenue Code by the probability that these penalties will be imposed, a probability that
is demonstrably lower than one.
The existing nominal penalties for tax avoidance fail to take into account variations in
probability detection. Yet this probability differs widely among various avoidance techniques,
making expected penalties for some strategies significantly lower than for others. Taxpayers
recognize the disparity and, if they decide to engage in tax avoidance at all, tend to choose the
type of avoidance that, to put it bluntly, is harder to find.

1

See, e.g., George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 Tax Notes 1449, 1449 (2005) (stating
that “[a]ny consideration of major tax reform in this country must give priority consideration to issues of
tax compliance and enforcement.”); David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L.R. 215,
228 (2002) (noting that “the explosion of tax shelters is considered by many to be one of the most pressing
problems facing our [tax] system today.”); Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax
Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 Tax Notes 221, 230 (2000) (“The Treasury has argued, and many
practitioners agree, that at present we face a crisis in which undesirable transactions that would
undoubtedly be shut down on detection (even if they work under current law) are compromising the entire
corporate income tax, and perhaps generating broader disrespect for the tax system.”). The Government
Accountability Office believes that tax enforcement is one of the high-risk areas, see Allen Kenney, Tax
Enforcement Makes GAO’s 2005 List of “High-Risk” Areas, 106 Tax Notes 531, 531 (2005) (“Given the
broad declines in IRS’s enforcement workforce, IRS’s decreased ability to follow up on suspected
noncompliance, the emergence of sophisticated evasion concerns, and the unknown effect of these trends
on voluntary compliance, IRS is challenged on virtually all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers
fulfill their obligations.”).
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This strategy is difficult to counter because the opportunity to conceal is unique to each
taxpayer. A questionable deduction that is all but invisible on one tax return will raise an obvious
red flag on another. The problem is not with the particular type of deduction, but, in large part,
with the way it fits with the rest of the taxpayer’s return. The current penalty regime makes
virtually no attempt to address this problem, focusing instead on transactions that all taxpayers
are, on average, more likely to use to reduce their tax liabilities.
This article suggests an alternative approach. I argue that the government should counter
taxpayers’ incentives to conceal by creating nominal penalties that would vary inversely with the
changes in probability of detection. If a nominal penalty prescribed in the statute is set to be
relatively high for the strategies that are harder to detect, it will offset a relatively low probability
of detection, resulting in more uniform expected penalties, weaker incentives to conceal, and
more effective deterrence.
I propose a new type of penalty that would accomplish this goal for a fairly wide
(although limited) set of avoidance techniques that use various subtractions from gross income
(such as losses, deductions, and credits) to reduce tax liability. The key insight is that subtraction
items that are likely to raise questions on audit generally fall in one of two categories: they are
either unusual for the taxpayer’s business or personal situation or they involve a drastic change in
an otherwise typical item on a return. The opposite is also true: deductions, credits, and losses
that are neither atypical nor significantly changed are less likely to invite additional scrutiny.
Therefore, if a rational risk-minimizing taxpayer looks for an avoidance strategy that will be
relatively difficult to detect, she is likely to choose the one using those subtractions that are
already present on her return, and that are present in a substantial amount.
For example, a suburban lawyer who has decided to overstate her deductions by $1,000
would probably choose to claim an extra $1,000 charitable deduction in addition to an
appropriately claimed $10,000 charitable deduction already present on her return rather than
taking a $1,000 farm loss that she has never claimed before. A ten percent increase in charitable
deductions is less likely to attract auditor’s attention than an inexplicable farm loss, so the
probability of detection, and, therefore, the expected future payment, is lower for the former
strategy.
If this suggestion about variations in probability of detection is correct (even if only in
part), we can raise nominal penalties for hard-to-detect strategies without knowing what they are
in advance. We can do this by linking the statutory penalty for avoidance using a particular
credit, deduction, or loss to the legitimate subtraction item of the same type on the return. That is,
the tax avoider (such as the lawyer) would be denied not only the tax item claimed
inappropriately (the $1,000 charitable deduction), but a fraction of the perfectly legitimate
subtraction claimed on the same line of her tax return as well (e.g., 10 percent of the $10,000
charitable deduction).
The main strength of the proposed penalty—and its fundamental difference from any tax
penalty existing today—is that it adjusts itself. If a taxpayer’s avoidance strategy generates a
deduction that has not appeared on her prior returns and is atypical for her business or personal
circumstances, the strategy is more likely to be detected. The proposed nominal penalty in this
case would be zero, however, because the total amount of the deduction and the amount of the
improperly claimed deduction are the same. On the other hand, if a taxpayer inappropriately
overstates a deduction that is and has been present on her return in a substantial amount, the
overstatement would be much harder to find. However, the proposed self-adjusting penalty in
this case would be significantly higher. As a result, the expected penalties for the two strategies
3

become much closer than they are today, the payoff from hiding tax avoidance is reduced, and the
overall deterrence is improved, all without any additional effort by the enforcement agency.
Many alternative nominal penalties may be devised based on the same fundamental
insight. The self-adjusting penalty may be equal to the entire legitimate subtraction item of a type
used in the avoidance arrangement, a fraction of that amount, or its multiple. It may or may not
take taxpayer’s fault into account. It may apply to all forms of avoidance and evasion, or only
those using particular deductions, credits, or losses. It may be fine-tuned in many different ways,
giving the government significant flexibility in influencing taxpayers’ decisions. Whatever form
of the proposed penalty is adopted, the self-adjusting penalty is likely to improve tax compliance
without consuming a lot of government resources while imposing relatively modest costs on most
taxpayers.
In addition to identifying and resolving a systemic flaw in the current enforcement
regime, this article aims to narrow the divide between the economic analysis of tax
noncompliance and the general deterrence scholarship. From street gangs to corporate
malefactors, from environmental violations to common law torts, scholars have considered how
to deter all types of offenses based on rigorous economic analysis.2 In addition to a considerable
literature focused on formal modeling,3 these inquiries have generated a spirited debate about the
types and magnitudes of real-life sanctions. Are monetary fines always more cost-effective than
incarceration?4 Could criminal penalties efficiently deter corporate misdeeds, or would only civil
sanctions reach this goal?5 Should we set punitive damages by taking into account variations in
probability of detection,6 by aiming to deny the benefits of the offense to the violator,7 or in some

2

The foundational work is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol.
Econ. 169 (1968). For its wide-reaching implications, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (2002); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of
Law, 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45 (2000).
3

See infra, text accompanying notes 37-52.

4

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaning and the Economic Analysis of Crime, 27 J. Leg. Stud. 609, 61517 (1998) (arguing with an established view that civil sanctions are more cost-effective than imprisonment
expressed, for example, in Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 409, 410-11 (1980)).
5

See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 4, at 618-622 (demonstrating why criminal corporate liability may be
efficient, disagreeing with Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 319
(1996) and V. S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 Harv. L. Rev.
1477 (1996)).
6

See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L.R.
869, 874 (1998).
7

See Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 Geo. L.J. 421, 456
(1998).
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other fashion?8 Institutional detail, expressive function of the law, and cognitive biases play
important roles in these debates.9
In contrast, formal models of tax noncompliance have largely ignored the task of
analyzing the optimal structure of nominal penalties. Leading scholars have recognized this
deficiency,10 but lack of attention continues. Furthermore, while tax academics have successfully
used sophisticated public finance models to scrutinize current and proposed substantive anti-tax
shelter doctrines,11 economic analysis of deterrence has remained mostly divorced from the
complexities and idiosyncrasies of actual tax enforcement. As a result, both the theoretical
analysis of tax penalties and its application to the sanctions that exist (or should exist) today trail
similar inquiries in most other areas of the law by a wide margin. This article begins the process
of bridging this gap.
The remainder of the article consists of five parts. Part II introduces the tax avoidance
problem and economic approach to deterrence. Part III identifies a critical flaw of the existing
enforcement regime. Part IV considers and rejects several possible responses and set forth the
proposal. Following the discussion of the proposal’s key features in Part V, Part VI addresses
some of the likely objections. Part VII concludes.

II. Tax Noncompliance: the Problem, the Causes, the Economic Analysis
1. Many Facets of Tax Avoidance
Each year, the government collects over $300 billion less in taxes than it believes it
should.12 This shortfall—the so-called tax gap—is not only large, but it has nearly tripled over

8

See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 Yale L.J. 347, 363 (2003)
(expressing a view that while economic deterrence is one of the important goals of punitive damages, it is
not their exclusive goal).
9

See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Deterrence and Damages, The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97
Mich. L. Rev. 2185, 2219-38 (1998) [hereinafter, The Multiplier Principle] (discussing, inter alia,
institutional issues, practical constraints, and symbolic and expressive effects of various penalties aimed at
approximating optimal deterrence); Kahan, supra note 4 (focusing on the expressive function of sanctions);
Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, 893-94, 957-62 (addressing potential responses to jury biases, offering
detailed jury instructions).
10

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are
Undesirable, 12 Int’l Rev. L. Econ. 3, 9 (1992) [hereinafter, Fines for Undesirable Acts] (noting that “it
seems inappropriate when analyzing optimal enforcement policy simply to assume, as is commonly done,
that the fine is fixed at some stated level . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement
and Evasion, 43 J. Pub. Econ. 221, 234 (1990) (acknowledging that the effect of penalty structure on tax
enforcement has not been considered in most studies of tax noncompliance, including his own); Frank A.
Cowell, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION 174, 228 n.18 (1990) (remarking that
the structure of tax penalties is the “subject [that] is relatively neglected in the literature.”).
11

See, e.g., Shaviro, supra note 1, at 237-44 (discussing the implications of the marginal efficiency cost of
funds model); David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines, 4 Am. Law
Econ. Rev. 88, 92-99 (2002) (relying on the compensated elasticity of taxable income analysis).
12

See Allen Kenney, New IRS Estimates Show Slight Widening of Tax Gap, 107 Tax Notes 7, 7 (2005).
This is a number reflecting voluntary tax payments. After the government’s collections efforts it is reduced
to about $250 billion, see id.
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the past two decades and continues to grow.13 Furthermore, the gap is just one of several signs of
a serious tax compliance problem. We are in the midst of a well-publicized tax shelter crisis.
Large and well-known companies see their tax planning strategies struck down as devious tax
shelters and sometimes are forced to pay penalties on top of the tax they had hoped to avoid.14
An attempt by an all-American manufacturer to reincorporate in a tax haven is thwarted by
outrage on Capitol Hill, a law suit by the state attorney general, and popular protest.15
Disenchanted wealthy tax shelter investors turn against their former advisers. As a result, some
of the nation’s largest investment banks, accounting firms, and law firms are facing numerous law
suits, including class actions.16 The Treasury department makes tax shelters one of its top
priorities and issues a set of regulations that reach far beyond any previous anti-avoidance
measures.17 Finally, Congress lends a hand to the Treasury’s efforts by significantly raising
penalties for tax shelter participants and promoters, in some cases to the tune of $10,000 a day.18
While the tax shelter crisis is perhaps the most visible side of the tax compliance
problem, it is almost certainly not the most costly one. According to many estimates, the largest
portion of the tax gap is due to underreporting of income by small businesses and self-employed
individuals, most of which falls under the rubric of tax evasion.19 Detecting and quantifying this
evasion is notoriously difficult because it mainly involves understating of cash receipts. Unlike
deductions and credits that appear on returns and must be substantiated if questioned, cash
receipts may not be reflected in any set of records. As a result, small business owners and
household workers have the lowest level of tax compliance, perhaps as low as 51 percent for
nonfarm proprietor income and 13 percent for informal supplier income.20 A recent report
attributes 67 percent of the tax gap to this type of evasion.21 In sum, wherever opportunities to

13

The gap was estimated at $90 billion for 1981, see Jonathan Skinner & Joel Slemrod, An Economic
Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 345, 345 (1985). It has been growing at about 15% annual rate
in the decade preceding 1981, see id. When adjusted for inflation, the rate of growth is lower. The
precision of the tax gap estimate is open to question, however, see, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L.
Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy, 38 Nat’l L.J. 355, 355 (1985) (explaining
why estimating tax noncompliance is “fraught with difficulties”).
14

See, e.g., Mark P. Gergen, The Logic of Deterrence: Corporate Tax Shelters, 55 Tax L.R. 255, 256-57
(2002) (describing the court losses of several major U.S. companies).
15

See, e.g., Stacey Stowe, Stanley Works Decides to Stay Put After All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at C1;
see also Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat’l Tax J. 877, 883 (2004)
[hereinafter Corporate Selfishness] (citing statement by Sen. Grassley that reincoporations of U.S.
companies in tax havens are “immoral”).
16

See, e.g., Susan Simmonds, Shelter Cases Highlight Uncertain Outcomes, 106 Tax Notes 45 (2005).

17

See infra, Part III.2 for a discussion of these regulations.

18

See I.R.C. § 6708.

19

Low-income proprietors are estimated to be the least compliance group of taxpayers, see, e.g., Kurt J.
Beron et. al., The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES, TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 67, 86-87 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (hereinafter, WHY
PEOPLE PAY TAXES).
20

See Joel Slemrod, Small Business and the Tax System, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 69, 84
(Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) [hereinafter, Small Business].
21

See Heather Bennett, IRS Must Get Grip on Tax Gap, Taxpayer Advocate Says, 106 Tax Notes 531
(2005).
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avoid or evade taxes present themselves, quite a few taxpayers of all stripes are eager to take
advantage.

2. Why Do People Pay Taxes?
The discussion so far may be viewed as suggesting that an all-out assault on tax
noncompliance is long overdue. It is not, at least not necessarily. To combat noncompliance one
needs to understand why it exists. Why do people pay taxes? Why do they evade? No single
theory has all the answers.
The economic approach to deterrence was introduced in the modern literature by Gary
Becker22 and it goes back to writings of Bentham23 and Beccaria.24 It suggests that potential
offenders take into account not just the size of the possible penalty, but also the likelihood that the
penalty will be imposed. Several models have been developed to describe taxpayers’ behavior
based on these assumptions.25 Unfortunately, the models fail to explain the “abnormally” high
level of tax compliance given the exceedingly low expected penalties, leaving scholars wondering
why people pay as much in taxes as they do.26
If the economic analysis does not fully explain tax compliance, what does? Perhaps,
looking at human beings as more than mere “rational rats”27 may provide the answer. Dan Kahan
and others have argued that cultural and social factors play an important role in tax compliance,
possibly more important than the threat of punishment. Taxpayers pay taxes, these scholars
assert, to avoid feelings of guilt, shame, and peer condemnation accompanying tax evaders,
because they value cooperation and believe that others are law-abiding taxpayers, and because
they feel pride fulfilling their civic duty.28 On the other hand, those who think that tax laws are

22

Becker, supra note 2.

23

See id., at 185 n.31 (citing Bentham).

24

See id., at 176, n.12 (citing Beccaria).

25

See infra, text accompanying notes 57-71.

26

See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 243 (“Perhaps the most surprising fact about tax shelters is that there
is not more sheltering. . . . It is not clear, given the wide variety of shelters, why any business pays tax at
all.”); Graetz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 358 (“Application of the standard economic theory of crime to
[many] tax avoidance cases . . . produces an unambiguous prediction: throughout the 1970s no one should
have paid the taxes they owed . . . .”). In part, tax withholding rules help most salaried employees to avoid
unnecessary temptations by putting their employers in charge of collecting and remitting employees’ taxes
to the government. As a result, compliance rates for these types of income approximate 100 percent, see,
e.g., Slemrod, Small Business, at 85. A well-publicized system of information reporting makes hiding
interest, dividend, certain other types of income futile as well, see id. The system is well-understood
because every From 1099 sent to a taxpayer reminds her that the same information is being provided to the
IRS. Withholding and reporting increase probability of detection for income subject to either regime to
almost 100 percent, necessarily leading to larger expected penalties and greater compliance. Even with
these qualifications, however, economic models developed so far do not provide a comprehensive account
of the actual taxpayers’ behavior.
27

Cowell, supra note 10, at 47.

28

See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Actions, and Law, 81 B.U.L. Rev. 333 (2001); James
Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Lit. 818, 850-51 (1998).
Economists respond that such phenomena as humiliation of an audit and tax prosecution and stigma of
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unjust, unfairly administered, or disagree with how the tax revenues are spent are more likely to
evade.29 These arguments may have profound consequences for policymakers deciding how to
improve tax compliance. If they are correct, publicizing a large tax gap and a wide spread of tax
shelters, raising penalties, or spending resources on high-profile tax prosecutions of rich and
powerful is likely to have a negative effect on deterrence by suggesting that tax avoidance is
commonplace and socially acceptable, even if risky.30 Finally, some scholars suggest that higher
penalties and appeals to moral values could work in tandem, especially if they are targeted at
different groups of taxpayers.31
Empirical research of tax avoidance and evasion exists, but it is somewhat sparse and has
produced inconclusive results. Data about the actual taxpayers’ behavior, results from laboratory
experiments, and survey information are each subject to their own limitations and imperfections,
making any findings heavily qualified. The most basic predictions of the economic deterrence
model—that higher penalties and higher likelihood that the penalties would be imposed improve
tax compliance—have not been rigorously tested.32 Several studies suggest that both factors
enhance deterrence, but the effect is small.33 Some scholars report that rewards for being a good
citizen and information about compliance by others work better than a threat of punishment for
being a cheater.34 Others come to exactly opposite conclusions based on the same experimental
data.35 Numerous surveys show that tax evasion is more prevalent among those who believe that
they are carrying an unfairly large tax burden.36 In sum, experimental data lends some support to
all existing theories of taxpayer behavior, while giving a decisive advantage to none.

being labeled a tax cheat are just additional costs to be taken into account in estimating expected penalties,
see, e.g., Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 13, at 348.
29

See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Doing the Full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase
Compliance?, 18 Can. J.L. Juris. 95, 97 (2005).
30

See Kahan, supra note 28, at 340-44.

31

See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio St.
L.J. 1453 (2003).
32

See Slemrod, Corporate Selfishness, at 887.

33

See Andreoni et al., supra note 28, at 822, 841-42 (discussing studies and concluding that all of them
“come with caveats,” but “present a fairly consistent picture in which both penalties and audit probabilities
have some deterrent effect, although the magnitude of these effects is still unclear”).
34

See Kahan, supra note 28, at 343 (citing the results of a study by the Minnesota Department of Revenue);
James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael McKee, Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder, Gentler IRS, in
WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 311, 321-323 (reporting that immediate rewards produced more compliance than
increased enforcement).
35

See Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125, 131-132 (2001)
(finding no statistically significant effects from normative appeals); Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal &
Charles Christian, Taxpayers Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled
Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 455, 465 (2000) (finding that higher audit rates increased
reported income and tax paid by low- and middle-income taxpayers, especially those with greater
opportunities to evade).
36

See Skinner & Slemrod, supra note 13, at 348.
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Clearly, more experimental data would be helpful in resolving theoretical debates. In the
meantime, the best one can do, it seems, is to explicitly base any proposal aimed at improving tax
administration on one of the competing views about taxpayers’ behavior. The proposal made in
this article is based on the economic approach.

3. The General Economic Analysis of Deterrence
Modern economic analysis of deterrence starts with Gary Becker’s observation that when
deciding whether or not to violate the law, rational utility-maximizing potential offenders take
into account not the nominal penalties (i.e., the sanctions set by the relevant statutory provisions),
but the expected ones.37 The difference between the two penalties arises because enforcement of
law is less than perfect and some offenses go unpunished. Thus, the expected penalty equals the
nominal penalty discounted by the probability that the penalty will be imposed, or
EP = NP x PP
where EP is the expected penalty, NP is the nominal penalty, and PP is the probability that the
penalty will be imposed, or probability of punishment.
But what should this expected penalty be? Economic theory suggests that rational agents
would behave efficiently if they take into account full costs of their actions, not just their internal
costs. By equating the expected penalty for a given act to the act’s external harm we would force
potential offenders to internalize this harm, achieving the efficient level of compliance.38 This
insight about the optimal expected sanction leads to an elegant proposal for the size of the optimal
nominal penalty: it should be equal to the external harm (EH) times the reciprocal of the
probability of punishment—the so-called “multiplier,”39 or
NP = EH x 1/PP40
Unfortunately, things are rarely that simple. First, because imposition of penalties is
costly, a portion of these costs that is not internalized by the offenders should be taken into
account in setting expected penalties.41 In addition, the basic formula should be adjusted to
account for risk aversion of potential offenders,42 other costs borne by them (such as attorney’s
fees and reputational losses),43 wealth effects,44 imperfect information about likelihood of

37

See Becker, supra note 2, at 176.

38

For a more detailed explanation, see, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 877-87.

39

Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. Leg. Stud. 463, 464 (1996)
[hereinafter, Damage Multipliers].
40

If a nominal penalty is set at this level, the expected penalty would be equal to the external harm of the
behavior being deterred: EP = NP×PP = (EH×1/PP)×PP=EH.
41

See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 470.

42

See Becker, supra note 2, at 178.

43

See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 465.

44

See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among
Individuals, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 618 (1991).
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detection,45 existence of both monetary and non-monetary sanctions,46 interaction between
general and specific deterrence,47 and other considerations.48 Finally, in order to reflect a
possibility of legal error, the probability of punishing an innocent defendant should be subtracted
from the probability of punishing a guilty one in the denominator of the multiplier.49
Yet, even if the external harm of a given offense could be measured precisely, and if all
adjustments could be made to determine the optimal nominal penalty, the success would be
illusory. The adjustment for a possibility of legal error just described is sufficient only if the error
rate does not depend on the gravity of the offense or the innocence of a non-offending behavior.
This assumption does not hold in many cases. More egregious offenses are much less likely to be
mistakenly excused than those that are barely illegal. Completely innocent behavior is much less
likely to be erroneously penalized than actions that come close to the line, even if they don’t cross
it.50 Whenever error rates vary in this fashion, the only way to maintain the first best level of
deterrence is to calculate the multiplier separately for each violation.51
Furthermore, aside from mistaken decisions to punish or excuse, in many cases more
serious offenses result in higher external harms (by definition) and are also more likely to be
detected and prosecuted. That is, both components of the expected penalty formula vary in the
same direction as the gravity of an offense changes. For example, consider a manufacturing plant
that produces valuable widgets but also emits pollution, sometimes in excess of the permissible
limit. A more egregious environmental violation would produce a larger smoke cloud that would
linger longer, raising probability that the violation would be detected. The enforcement agency is
more likely to pursue large polluters, raising probability of prosecution. Perhaps, a judge or a
jury would be less sympathetic to a flagrant offender, raising probability of conviction. Any of
these effects would increase probability of punishment for a more serious violation compared to a
less significant one. When this occurs, it is, again, impossible to determine a single probability of
punishment (or a single multiplier) that will produce the optimal nominal penalty for all levels of
a given offense. Instead, the multiplier will need to be set taking into account the gravity of the
harm on a case-by-case basis.52
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See Omri Ben-Shahar, Playing Without a Rulebook: Optimal Enforcement When Individuals Learn the
Penalty Only by Committing the Crime, 17 Int. Rev. Law Econ. 409, 409-10 (1997); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed About the Probability of
Apprehension, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 365 (1992).
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See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment, 24 J. Pub.
Econ. 89 (1984).
47

See Steven Shavell, Specific versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. Pol. Econ. 1088 (1991).
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For example, several commentators pointed out that it may be efficient to set expected penalty slightly
below the external harm caused by the offense in question, see Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 471, or
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While conceptually possible, the case-by-case multipliers detract from the versatility of
the model and, in any case, do not appear to be a particularly realistic solution.53 In addition, they
could lead to the arguably unjust (and politically unacceptable) result when egregious violations
would face lower nominal penalties than marginal offenses.54 If precise deterrence is
unattainable, what is the practical value of the expected penalty analysis?
The answer comes from the observation that in making their decisions, individuals
respond to the marginal changes in expected penalties and not just to their absolute values.55 For
example, if two different offenses produce external harms of $100 and $200 respectively, the
proper marginal deterrence will be achieved if the expected penalties are set at $300 and $400
respectively, even though their absolute values will be clearly excessive. Becker’s original
observation that the expected penalty depends on the nominal penalty and the probability of
punishment suggests that a change in the expected penalty depends on the changes in each of
these variables. At the same time, deterring two equally harmful offenses by subjecting them to
equal nominal penalties may be a misguided approach. If one offense is less likely to be punished
than the other, having equal statutory fines for both offenses is undesirable from the marginal
deterrence perspective.
In sum, the ideal of optimal deterrence remains elusive. However, achieving optimal
marginal deterrence is a worth-wile second-best objective.56 If policymakers learn to identify
marginal variations in external harms produced by different violations and to counter them by
changing either the magnitude of likelihood of fines, the enforcement regime would become more
efficient.

4. The Economic Approach to Tax Evasion
Starting with Becker’s observations, the early attempts to model tax evasion viewed the
decision to evade as a choice under uncertainty, or, more technically, a gamble.57 A taxpayer
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See Craswell, Damage Multipliers, at 477 (noting that “more realistically, all offenses [of the same type]
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See id.
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George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. Polit. Economy 526, 527 (1970).
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Economic analysis of tax noncompliance focuses almost exclusively on tax evasion—an unambiguously
illegal non-payment of taxes. The seminal taxpayer-as-a-gambler model was offered in Michael G.
Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323 (1972) and
modified in Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J. Pub. Econ. 201
(1974). The scholarship on the subject is vast and several excellent reviews are available, see, e.g., Joel
Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration 1423, 1429-1438, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002) [hereinafter, Tax
Administration]; Andreoni et al., supra note 28, at 823-834. The discussion follows the literature in
focusing on tax evasion by individuals, see, e.g., Slemrod, Small Business, at 83 (“Nearly all the theoretical
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facing known and exogenously fixed nominal penalty and probability of punishment compares
the expected gain from tax evasion to the expected cost of tax penalties.58 The models are static:
all taxpayer’s decisions (and, therefore, taxable income) are fixed, and possible responses by the
tax authority are ignored. The models suggest that if the expected value of the gamble is positive,
taxpayers will evade all tax, and if it is negative, they will fully comply with the law.59 This
result is modified once taxpayers’ risk aversion is taken into account. At some point, a risk
averse taxpayer would not undertake additional evasion despite its positive expected value
because the size of the bet would be simply too large for her taste.60 Furthermore, if probability
of detection grows with the size of evasion, it will not be optimal to evade all tax.61
Despite numerous simplifying assumptions, the consequences suggested by the static
models are complicated and largely uncertain. The effect of the tax rate on evasion, for example,
depends on whether the penalty is based on income understatement or tax understatement.62
Relative risk aversion determines the effect of the taxpayer’s income on the magnitude of
noncompliance.63 Attempts to model the role of tax practitioners further add to the uncertainty.64
In contrast to these ambiguous conclusions, one result is fairly clear: increases in probability of
punishment and in nominal penalty decrease incentives to evade.65
Dynamic models relax the unrealistic assumption that the relevant parties do not take into
account each other’s actions. These models treat the interaction between taxpayers and the IRS
as a game rather than a gamble.66 The IRS tries to maximize the revenue collected, taxpayers
respond by deciding how much income to report. The models yield new insights, yet
considerable uncertainty remains.67 However, an increase in nominal penalties unambiguously
increases compliance.68
Finally, more general models take into account that rational individuals may respond to
taxation in two alternative ways in addition to engaging in evasion.69 First, taxpayers may change

58

See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1430, 1451-52. The description of this and other models
provides only a very general summary highlighting the aspects of the literature relevant for our purposes.
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Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J. Law. Econ. & Org. 1, 1 (1986).
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their work effort and the types of consumption and saving decisions they make (I will refer to
these as real responses).70 Second, they can enter into clearly legal tax minimization strategies.
Analysis tends to focus on how such factors as tax rate and wage rate affect the taxpayer’s choice
among evasion, legal tax minimization, and real responses, and how adopting any given type of
response affects the other two. The models add richness and realism to the world described by
the more limited static and dynamic models, but this realism comes at a price of further
complexity and uncertainty. For example, taking into account only the possibility that, in
addition to evasion, taxpayers may respond to taxes by reducing their work effort makes the
effect of higher nominal penalties and stronger enforcement ambiguous.71
In addition to being fairly indeterminate, and in stark contrast with the general deterrence
scholarship, models of individuals’ tax compliance are entirely unconcerned with devising
optimal expected penalties.72 This disparity is important because it is impossible to determine the
optimal nominal penalty according to Becker’s formula without first deciding what the optimal
expected penalty is. Furthermore, we need to understand the reasons for this disparity in order to
evaluate whether the theoretical framework for economic analysis of tax enforcement should be
conceptually different from that applicable in other areas of the law.
Perhaps, the divergence could be explained if we consider the fundamental difference
between tax evasion and activities typically addressed by the general deterrence literature, such as
pollution, accidents, and the like. Returning to the widget-making plant example, note that
pollution is an unfortunate and inevitable side effect of a socially beneficial activity—operation
of the plant. Tax evasion has no concomitant welfare enhancing companion. We are concerned
with over-deterring pollution because this may cause the factory to under-produce. There is no
analogous concern with tax evasion. In other words, while pollution (or, more precisely, the
pollution-generating manufacturing activity) may be socially beneficial at some level, tax evasion
never is.73 Hence, the concern for overdeterrence that looms large in the general deterrence
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literature74 is absent from the economic models of tax evasion. Because any tax evasion is
undesirable, it is impossible to have too little of it.75
But why is tax evasion undesirable from the economic perspective? In other words, what
is its external harm? The first answer that comes to mind—that the external harm of evasion is
the amount of tax evaded—is mistaken. To see why, consider another critical difference between
pollution and evasion. Pollution harms the environment and makes people sick, it reduces
welfare of the society as a whole. The same is not true of evasion. If evasion succeeds, the
evader benefits from extra wealth. If evasion is detected and the evader is forced to pay the tax,
someone else benefits from the same funds. The effect of collecting (or failing to collect) the
revenue in question is, therefore, redistributive.76 On the other hand, government’s efforts to
combat evasion come with real costs that are borne by the government, the evaders, and even by
the innocent taxpayers.77 Thus, the two distinctions between evasion and pollution point in the
opposite directions. Because evasion does not come attached to a valuable activity that we would
like to encourage at some level, it seems that we should strive to eliminate it completely. But
because evasion does not produce, it seems, any external harm, yet is costly to counter, it is
unclear what is the efficiency-based reason to worry about tax evasion at all.78
One answer to this question was suggested by Louis Kaplow. Tax evasion, he argued,
upsets the distribution of tax burdens (and, more generally, wealth) in the society.79 Assuming
this distribution is optimal without evasion, deviating from it gives rise to an “equity effect.”80
The value of the social welfare function (which necessarily contains distributive preferences) in
the presence of evasion is lower than without it because, by definition, this function is maximized
if no evasion takes place. The difference between the two values is the welfare cost of evasion.
The analysis doesn’t end here, however. Taxpayers will respond to evasion opportunities
by changing their behavior, for example by working less, saving more, or moving to industries
where evading is easier (such as cash-based businesses). When the economy fully reflects these
responses (i.e., reaches a long-run equilibrium), the equity effect will be replaced by the
“efficiency effect.”81 In addition, as long as some taxpayers with evasion opportunities remain
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honest while others evade, the honest taxpayers will be treated inequitably because their after-tax
income would be lower than socially optimal. Thus, the welfare cost of evasion is likely to have
both an equity and efficiency components.82
If we posit that the welfare cost of evasion is its external harm, we can use the analysis
developed by the general deterrence literature to optimize expected penalties for tax evasion. But
this forces us to consider whether the problems with the multiplier principle identified by this
literature are likely to exist in the tax context. Unfortunately, they are. More egregious evasion
(for example, evading tax on entire income rather than only on its portion) would produce larger
external harm and also is more likely to be noticed, prosecuted, and punished.83 Likelihood of
mistaken conviction (or exoneration) may also relate to the size of evasion. A fraudulent but
small understatement of income is more likely to be attributed to a taxpayer’s mistake than a large
one.84 Thus, the general deterrence analysis fully applies in the tax enforcement context and it
suggests that only case-by-case multipliers would produce optimal tax deterrence.
Moreover, even the case-by-case multipliers are unlikely to help in optimizing tax
enforcement as a practical matter. The task of calculating the external harm of evasion is
daunting.85 The calculation is based on the shape of the social welfare function—a notoriously
controversial issue that involves fundamental questions of distributive justice. It is difficult and
contentious enough to put values on a person’s health or the harm to the environment. One can
only imagine the outcry if the government attempts to determine expected penalties for tax
noncompliance based on its calculations derived from a (any!) social welfare function. Besides,
we have no choice but to value personal injury and environmental damages when the victims seek
compensation in courts. Proponents of the economic analysis of deterrence may apply multipliers
to these exogenously determined values, as they do, for example, whey they rationalize punitive
damages.86 Scholars thinking about optimal tax enforcement do not have the same luxury—
welfare cost of tax noncompliance continues to be only a theoretical concept.
The general deterrence literature suggest that if absolute perfection is out of reach,
striving for optimal marginal deterrence would be an efficiency-enhancing strategy. In order to
pursue it in tax context, we need to consider the various forms of evasion and avoidance. This
analysis has been almost entirely absent from the tax compliance literature.87 The omission is due
in part to the subject that economists chose to study, and in part to the level of generality at which
they chose to study it.
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Economic analysis of tax enforcement has been concerned almost exclusively with tax
evasion (defined as a clearly illegal intentional non-payment of taxes), as distinguished from tax
avoidance (defined as a clearly legal reduction of one’s tax liability).88 Thus, to an economist,
failing to report cash income is evasion; borrowing under a home equity line of credit rather than
from a credit card company is avoidance.89 Economic literature acknowledges the existence of a
gray area in the middle, but relegates it to almost an afterthought.90
This delineation may be fruitful as a first approximation for developing and testing
economic models, but it is of little help to those interested in studying how taxpayers choose
among a multitude of alternative tax-motivated arrangements none of which is clearly legal or
illegal. Because the proposed penalty primarily aims at affecting precisely this choice, I will refer
to the transactions falling into this intermediate category as tax avoidance, as distinguished from
tax evasion (clearly illegal actions due to deliberate cheating) and tax planning (clearly
permissible tax reduction strategies). So defined, tax avoidance refers to any transaction or
position whose tax treatment is uncertain.
Economic models neither aim at, nor are capable of, differentiating among various types
of tax noncompliance, or even different forms of evasion. They implicitly treat all evasion
strategies as having the same “price” and available in an unlimited amount.91 These assumptions
are largely justified as long as only evasion is considered. Because of the evasion’s very nature,
one does not need to develop elaborate strategies, engage in sophisticated legal analysis, pay tax
shelter promoters, and carry out costly and economically unnecessary transactions hoping to
bolster the dubious schemes used to evade tax. The most common evasion strategy is simple,
well-known, and equally available to taxpayers large and small: one simply falsifies the income
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others in limiting the term tax evasion to intentional violations, see, e.g., Lederman, supra note 31, at 1455;
Cooper, supra note 64, at 35-36.
89

See, e.g., Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1428. Another example of what economists call
tax avoidance is selling depreciated securities on December 31 to accelerate the losses but waiting to
dispose of appreciated securities until January 1 of the following calendar (and tax) year to defer the gains,
see id. Yet, Congress believes that any arrangement created with a purpose of “avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax” should be penalized, see I.R.C.§§ 6662(d)(2)(C), 6662A(b)(2)(B), 6707A(c)(1). To be
fair to the economists, confusion about evasion/avoidance terminology is pervasive. One popular income
tax treatise defines tax avoidance as “lawful modes of minimizing or avoiding tax liability,” Boris I.
Bittker, Martin J. McMahon & Lawrence A. Zelenak, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, ¶
1.03[2] (emphasis added), while another defines it as noncriminal minimization of tax liability, see Boris I.
Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.2 (2005). Both
sources define evasion as fraudulent behavior.
90

See Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1428-29 (acknowledging that there are “many gray areas
where the dividing line [between evasion and avoidance] is not clear, but concluding that “[f]ine distinction
among the types of behavioral responses to taxation is not possible and is for many issues not crucial.”). In
one of his recent articles, Joel Slemrod took a different approach, combining evasion with “abusive”
avoidance, i.e., tax shelters, in an attempt to “avoid getting bogged down trying to distinguish between
what technically is (illegal) tax evasion and what is (legal) tax avoidance.” Slemrod, Corporate
Selfishness, at 885.
91
See id., at 888. The need for this analysis, however, has been clear for some time, see, e.g., Slemrod &
Yitzhaki, supra note 72, at 190 (“The optimization problem should be expanded to include many types of
individuals, with different opportunities to evade and different tastes.”)

16

numbers on the return (at least as long as income is not subject to an information reporting
regime).92
The story is markedly different when we turn to avoidance. Unlike evasion, avoidance is
often based on overstating any of the deductions, credits, and losses so omnipresent in the
Internal Revenue Code. A choice among these subtraction items necessarily gives taxpayers
more freedom to vary their avoidance strategies, and various strategies bring with them various
costs. For example, a taxpayer may expend considerable resources trying to embellish the
avoidance transaction, hoping to make it look “better” (more plausible, less aggressive) to an
auditor or a judge.93 Or taxpayer may obtain a legal opinion supporting the transaction, making it
more difficult for the government to assess penalties. A taxpayer may also try to conceal the
aggressive position, making it more difficult (costly) for the government to detect it.
Overall, some forms of avoidance are more aggressive than others, some are easier to
conceal than others, some are more expensive to implement than others. All of these variations
mean that once a taxpayer decides to engage in tax avoidance, she would have a variety of
strategies at her disposal. These strategies would have different, perhaps markedly different,
“prices” (i.e., private costs), and they would be available in different amounts. Because tax
enforcement models deal exclusively with evasion, they ignore these variations completely. They
posit taxpayers facing a simple choice: to evade or not to evade. This binary decision does not
call for marginal analysis.94 A similar inquiry applied in avoidance context (i.e., to avoid or not
to avoid) is a grossly inadequate reflection of reality. The choice faced by taxpayers who decide
to engage in tax avoidance is much more complex. In fact, for most taxpayers the question
whether or not to avoid may be decidedly secondary. The important decisions are how to avoid
(i.e., which particular transactions to use) and to what extent (i.e., how aggressive one should be).
The tax evasion models are simply not designed to analyze these marginal decisions. Thus, they
provide no insights into how to optimize taxpayers’ choices of various evasion and, in particular,
avoidance strategies. That is, no existing model aims at, let alone succeeds in, optimizing
marginal deterrence.
What are the practical implications of this theoretical analysis? While tax evasion
models are largely indeterminate, they consistently demonstrate that nominal penalties and
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probability of punishment play an important role in shaping taxpayers’ behavior. Empirical
studies confirm these conclusions, even if to a somewhat uncertain extent.95 Finally, as discussed
below, Congress and the IRS have varied both the nominal sanctions and the likelihood of their
imposition in an effort to improve tax administration,96 and there are plenty of statements by the
representatives of both branches confirming that the attention to these factors has been by no
means accidental.97 In light of the theoretical support, empirical evidence, and the statutory and
regulatory measures focused on the two components of Becker’s formula, it is worth taking a
closer look at whether the existing tax enforcement regime reflects the core insights of the
economic theory.
In undertaking this inquiry, we should remember that optimal expected penalties for tax
noncompliance are at best an abstract concept. Necessarily, the task of setting optimal nominal
penalties remains for another day. Optimizing marginal deterrence is an attractive second-best
objective, but the theoretical framework needed to reach it is largely absent. Thus, in analyzing
the deterrence effects of the existing regime, and in considering the merits of any alternatives, the
best we can do is to strive for a third-best solution of improving (rather than optimizing) marginal
deterrence. Therefore, the following inquiry into the structure of the current statutory sanctions is
modest in scope: it considers whether the current regime creates incentives that are clearly
undesirable based on the economic analysis of deterrence. The point, therefore, is not to test
whether our tax enforcement system is perfect, but to ensure that it has no obvious flaws.

III. A Critical Flaw of the Existing Penalties Regime
1. Nominal Penalties: When They Change and When They Don’t
In dealing with penalties, the Internal Revenue Code certainly lives up to its reputation.
The penalty provisions are numerous, technical, and scattered throughout the voluminous statute.
However, once one finds a path through the maze, it turns out that most civil tax penalties for
avoidance and evasion are calculated in one of two ways: either as a fixed dollar amount or as a
fixed percentage of the underpaid tax liability.98 Penalties of both types change based on two
variables: aggressiveness of a particular avoidance transaction and its absolute size.
The magnitude of nominal penalties set as a fixed dollar amount frequently depends on
the seriousness of a violation, with more significant offenses resulting in higher nominal
penalties. For example, a failure to furnish information about a so-called reportable transaction is

95

See supra, text accompanying notes 32-36.

96

See infra, Part III.1-2.

97

See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 97-494, at 272-73 (1982) (justifying a new penalty by the need to “deter the
[taxpayers’] use of undisclosed questionable reporting positions” taken “in hope that they will not be
audited.”); H.R. Rep. 101-247, at * (1989) (referring to the need to “reduce the incentives of taxpayers and
their advisors to ‘play the audit lottery.’”); see also Graetz & Wilde, supra note 13, at 355 (suggesting that
“[n]ot only were the 1981 and 1982 legislative enactments consistent with the basic posture of the
economics literature, but the 1982 committee reports seem also explicitly to embrace the economic model .
. . .”).
98

Other types of penalties apply in specific circumstances, see, e.g., I.R.C. § 32(k) (earned income tax
credit disallowed for 10 years following a fraudulent claiming of the credit); I.R.C. § 6707A (taxpayer must
disclose a tax penalty in its financial reports).

18

penalized less severely ($50,000 per violation) than a similar violation with respect to a so-called
listed transaction ($200,000 or more per violation) on the ground, one presumes, that a listed
transaction is certain, while a reportable transaction is only likely, to be abusive.99 Similarly, the
longer the period when an adviser fails to produce a list of potential tax shelter participants, the
higher is the nominal penalty for the failure.100
Most civil penalties for avoidance or evasion are calculated as a fixed percentage of the
understated or underpaid tax liability rather than as a fixed dollar amount. These penalties, too,
usually depend on the gravity of the offense. Thus, a nominal penalty for civil fraud (75 percent)
is higher than for negligence (20 percent).101 The same is true for underpayments caused by a
“gross” valuation misstatement (40 percent) compared to a one that is merely “substantial” (20
percent).102 In each case, a relatively more egregious violation leads to a larger nominal penalty.
Many fines set as a fixed dollar amount increase with the absolute size of an offense,
regardless of how egregious it is. For example, penalties for failure to file correct information
returns grow with the number of non-compliant returns.103 Penalties calculated as a fixed
percentage of an underpayment or understatement by definition grow in absolute dollar terms as
the amount of the underpayment or understatement increases.104 Thus on average, larger
avoidance transactions are subject to higher nominal penalties in absolute dollar terms.
The Code also provides for variation in nominal penalties based on the changes in
probability of punishment, or, more specifically, in one of its principal components. Probability
of punishment is a cumulative probability that an offense will be detected, selected for
prosecution, that the government will prevail at trial on the substantive issue, decide to seek a
penalty and convince a court to impose it, the judgments favoring the government will survive
appeals, and, finally, the government will actually collect the penalty from a taxpayer.
Probability of punishment is a product of individual probabilities for each of these steps.
For the remainder of this article I will focus on a single component of the probability of
punishment—probability of detection—for two reasons. First, as we are about to see, this
probability has always been very low for most taxpayers. Quite possibly, probability of detection
is the smallest among the relevant probabilities and, therefore, has the largest absolute effect on
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the overall probability of punishment.105 Second, the penalty proposed in this article aims at
strengthening deterrence by increasing probability of detection where it is currently particularly
low.
The Internal Revenue Code’s mechanism for varying nominal penalties depending on the
differences in probability of detection is an inducement to disclose.106 In certain cases, penalties
are reduced if taxpayers voluntarily highlight questionable transactions on their returns. Thus, an
accuracy-related penalty is waived if a taxpayer adequately discloses the relevant facts and her
position satisfies a low “reasonable basis” standard.107 In the absence of disclosure, the taxpayer
would be liable for penalties unless the disputed position met a higher “substantial authority”
threshold.108 Similarly, a new penalty for engaging in a reportable transaction is 20 percent if the
transaction is disclosed and 30 percent if it is not.109
Variation of nominal penalties for disclosed and undisclosed transactions is relatively
modest. On the other hand, probability of detection increases dramatically with disclosure. If the
taxpayer highlights the transaction for the IRS, virtually all remaining uncertainty about the future
tax payment is due to a possibility that the government may or may not agree with the intended
treatment. Without disclosure the taxpayer primarily is playing the audit lottery and facing
exceedingly favorable odds.110 Therefore, most taxpayers are likely to choose not to disclose and
face a low risk of paying 120 percent or so of a given tax liability plus interest rather than
disclose and take a much higher risk of paying 100 percent of the same liability.111 Furthermore,
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As discussed below, the rate at which the IRS imposes penalties is also exceedingly low, see infra, note
246.
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The recent legislation and Treasury regulations discussed below, see infra, text accompanying notes
123-125, establish a mandatory disclosure regime, but, with one exception mentioned later in the
paragraph, do not provide for variation in nominal penalties for the substantive violation based on the
likelihood of detection. Rather, these rules penalize violations of the disclosure requirements as an
independent offense.
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See I.R.C. § 6662A(c). If a taxpayer uses the services of a “material advisor,” the advisor is required to
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Over the past several decades average audit rates declined precipitously, reaching an all-time low of
0.49 percent in 2000, see Allen Kenney, Everson Touts Increased IRS Enforcement in Fiscal 2004, 105 Tax
Notes 1071, 1071 (2004). The rate of in-person (rather than correspondence) audits was 0.16% in 2002 and
0.15% in 2004, see id. To be sure, audits are targeted and for some categories rates are much higher than
on average. Yet, the rates are very low for some of the least compliant types of taxpayers, see id., at 1073
(reporting that audit rate for small businesses declined from 0.58% in 2003 to 0.32% in 2004). Besides,
audit rates for virtually all categories have been declining for some time, see id., at 1072 (showing declines
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Seasoned practitioners agree. Considering the likely effects of a 20% increase in penalty for a tax
shelter-related understatement if the position was not disclosed on a return, Michael Schler noted: “if a
taxpayer would engage in a transaction without disclosure in the face of a potential 20% penalty, the
taxpayer is hardly likely to disclose because of the risk of a 40% penalty.” Michael L. Schler, Ten More
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because the probability of having to pay tax if a transaction is revealed is higher for more
aggressive transactions while the likelihood that a transaction would be eventually detected is not
necessarily dependent of its aggressiveness, taxpayers have stronger incentives not to disclose
more dubious schemes. In sum, the existing inducement to disclose is unlikely to work in many
cases, and it is less likely to work where it would be needed most.
As a result, the structure of nominal penalties in the Internal Revenue Code has a
potentially serious weakness. Nominal penalties are higher for more aggressive arrangements
and for those that reduce tax liability by a larger amount. However, other than varying penalties
depending on whether a transaction is disclosed (a variation that is unlikely to be of great
significance for the reasons just described), nominal penalties are independent of, and unaffected
by, probability of detection. This would not be particularly troubling if probability of detection
remained fairly constant from one strategy to the next. However, there is every reason to think
that it differs widely among different taxpayers and strategies, producing variations in expected
penalties that are not only significant, but also unintended and undesirable from the marginal
deterrence perspective.

2. Deliberate Variations in Probability of Detection
In tax enforcement context, probability of detection has two main components: audit rate
and audit effectiveness. The former is the likelihood that a return will be examined by an IRS
agent. The latter is the odds that the auditor will find avoidance during the examination.
Changes in both of components affect the overall probability.
Starting with audit rates, it is well-known that IRS examinations are not conducted at
random. Based on the information gathered through the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement
Program (“TCMP”) that ran for almost three decades and is regarded as the best source of
information about tax noncompliance,112 the IRS developed formulas for selecting returns that are
more likely to contain questionable items.113 Furthermore, the IRS has been traditionally focused
on the magnitude of potential audit adjustments.114 As a result, audit rates are higher for
corporations than for individuals, and for larger corporations compared to the smaller ones.115
Similarly, returns of higher income individuals are examined more frequently than of those with

Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 Tax L.
Rev. 325, 363 (2002).
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See Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 Kan. L. Rev. 1255, 1261 (2002) (giving a detailed description of the
program); Slemrod & Yitzhaki, Tax Administration, at 1439.
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See, e.g., Brown & Mazur, supra note 112, at 1262. As a result of this program, the percentage of
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However, this percentage has been on the rise because the government’s data became outdated, see id., at
1263. A new program has been put in place in 2001 and the data has just started to arrive, see Kenney,
supra note 12, at 7.
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See, e.g., Brown & Mazur, supra note 112, at 1267 n.35; Jeffrey A. Dubin, Michael J. Graetz & Louis L.
Wilde, The Changing Face of Tax Enforcement, 43 Tax Law. 893, 903 (1989) (noting that “the audit
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lower incomes,116 taxpayers with business or farm income face higher chances of an audit than
those without it,117 and the unfortunate souls whose returns trigger the audit selection formulas
are examined more often than those who manage to file inconspicuous returns. The differences
are dramatic. At one extreme, the largest companies undergo a continuous audit. At another,
individual taxpayers who earn primarily wage income and take standard deductions face an audit
rate in the neighborhood of one half of one percent.
In contrast with audit rates that are well-known and well-documented, audit effectiveness
is much harder to estimate because the inquiry involves a counterfactual. To gauge audit
effectiveness, we would need to compare the number of questionable transactions actually
identified during tax audits with the number of these transactions that would have been identified
had auditors been able to spot all of them. They can’t and there lies the problem. Of course,
there is a perfect source of information on the issue—the taxpayers themselves. For obvious
reasons, data collected from this source is not particularly reliable, no matter how hard the
researches work to convince the taxpayers who participate in the surveys that their revelations
will remain confidential.118 The existing estimates of audit effectiveness suggest that somewhere
between one half and two thirds of noncompliance remained undetected during the unusually
thorough TCMP audits.119 This likely means that the rate of detection during typical audits is
below (perhaps well below) 50 percent.
Nonetheless, it is quite clear that audit effectiveness (and probability of detection in
general) is higher for transactions of a particular type—those subject to mandatory disclosure
regimes. The so-called Schedule M-1 is a case in point. For more than four decades, large and
mid-size corporate taxpayers have been required to attach to their tax returns a special form
where they reconciled their financial and tax accounting figures, Schedule M-1.120 The
government recognized that the two accounting systems create the opposite incentives: taxpayers
would prefer to have more income for financial reporting purposes, but less income for tax
purposes. While tax and financial accounting rules differ and there is nothing inherently wrong
when a transaction produces a so-called book-tax difference, there is a higher probability that a
tax auditor would find aggressive tax positions if she focuses on these transactions. This is
because many of the same considerations that point, for example, to treating a given security as
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117

See, Slemrod, Small Business, at 92.

118
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in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 125, 138 (referring to the IRS estimates that it detects one third of unreported
income by individuals and one half of unreported income by corporations); Andreoni et al., supra note 28,
at 850 (suggesting a 50% success rate).
120

See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gary, Burdens May Outweigh Benefits for Schedule M-3 Filers, 105 Tax Notes
632, 632 (2004) (noting that Schedule M-1 has not been updated in more than 40 years). This schedule has
recently undergone a major revision, as discussed below, see infra text accompanying notes 161-163.
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equity (rather than debt) for accounting purposes also suggest that it should be treated as equity
for tax purposes. In the end, the proper tax characterization of the security may well be debt. But
the question is likely to be close precisely because the security had enough equity-like features to
swing the accounting treatment the other way.121 A special disclosure requirement forcing
taxpayers to separately report all book-tax differences raises probability of detection in an area
that, on average, is more likely to encompass noncompliance.122
The government’s latest effort to combat proliferation of abusive tax shelters embodies
the same idea on a grand scale. The recent tax shelter regulations (“Regulations”) identify the
most typical features of transactions viewed by the government as tax avoidance and require
taxpayers to disclose all transactions that possess any of these features (the so-called “reportable
transactions”).123 In addition to significant book-tax differences, transactions that result in large
losses, involve brief asset holding periods, are protected by confidentiality agreements, or by
contingent fee and similar arrangements trigger the disclosure requirements. Taxpayers must also
disclose any of the specific transactions designated by the government as, essentially, illegitimate
tax shelters (the so-called “listed transactions”).124 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the
“2004 Act”) expanded the Regulations’ reach even further, and backed them up with new
penalties, including a dramatic and heretofore unheard of penalty for tax advisors equal to
$10,000 per each day of a violation.125
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Under the Act, a failure to disclose a listed transaction or a reportable transaction (as they are defined in
the Regulations) with a significant tax avoidance purpose is subject to penalties regardless of whether the
transaction is eventually litigated and upheld by a court, see I.R.C. § 6707A. Taxpayers who incurred
penalties under these rules must disclose this fact on statements filed with the SEC, if any, see I.R.C. §
6707A(e). A broad range of organizers, promoters, legal advisors, and accountants (the so-called “material
advisors”) involved in any reportable transaction above a given size must disclose their participation and
are subject to serious penalties for failure to comply, see I.R.C. § 6111, 6707. In addition, material advisors
are required to keep the lists of their clients who participated in any reportable transaction regardless of its
size, see I.R.C. § 6112, and provide any such lists upon the government’s request or face a draconian
penalty of $10,000 per day, see I.R.C. § 6708. Finally, the Act added a new penalty for any understatement
related to a listed or reportable transaction with a tax avoidance purpose that applies even if participation in
this transaction made no difference for the taxpayer’s overall tax bill (because, for example, the taxpayer
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Just like the Schedule M-1, the Regulations create a class of transactions that will be
scrutinized in greater detail than the rest of the return. The reportable transaction categories were
chosen precisely because they are more likely to encompass dubious arrangements. Because the
probability of finding avoidance is higher if an auditor focuses on these transactions, she should
be expected to do just that.126
Finally, audit effectiveness is very high when taxpayers themselves highlight their
questionable positions for the government. They do so, sometimes, in response to one of several
government’s programs designed to cajole (rather than force) taxpayers to reveal these positions
either before or after they file their returns. Programs in the former category provide certainty in
exchange for self-identification.127 Post-filing programs such as amnesty and settlement offers
entice taxpayers to confess about their tax avoidance in exchange for a reduction in (or
elimination of) penalties.128 The government has recently used both types of offers and has
expressed satisfaction with the results.129
Taxpayers who take advantage of any of these programs dramatically change probability
of detection for any given strategy. But one would hardly expect them to do so irrationally or
accidentally. In case of pre-filing programs, taxpayers who identify themselves most likely
believe that nominal penalties would not apply in any case. Settlements and amnesties have little
effect on taxpayers’ ex ante calculations at the time they decide to undertake avoidance
strategies.130 In sum, the voluntary disclosure programs are unlikely to change expected penalties
to a significant extent.
In contrast, variations in probability of detection due to differing audit rates and
mandatory disclosure regimes surely produce divergent expected penalties for various types of
taxpayers and transactions. A large company under a continuous audit has a chance that an
aggressive transaction reflected on Schedule M-1 would go unnoticed, but the odds are against
the taxpayer.131 The expected penalty is relatively close to its nominal value in this case. On the

126
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other hand, a small entrepreneur who takes a questionable deduction not subject to any mandatory
disclosure regime is unlikely to be audited, the deduction is unlikely to be questioned on audit,
and the expected penalty is nowhere near its nominal size.
These variations in the expected penalties, however, are deliberate. In fact, the very
reason why the largest companies undergo a continuous audit and why taxpayers are required to
disclose reportable and listed transactions is that the government is particularly concerned about
noncompliance of these taxpayers and by use of these transactions. In case of reportable
transactions the deterrence objective is especially clear. The government believes that many
transactions covered by the Regulations are aggressive, so the higher expected penalties for these
arrangements are designed to deter taxpayers from using them, or, in other words, to induce
taxpayers to enter into transactions not subject to the Regulations.132
Whether the government’s is likely to succeed is less than clear,133 but one can hardly
doubt that the measures discussed in this section reflect the government’s deliberate efforts to
vary expected penalties by altering probability of detection (and, in some cases, nominal penalties
as well). The same cannot be said about the disparities discussed next.

3. The Red Flags Strategy and Its (Unintended) Consequences
Mandatory disclosure rules such as Schedule M-1 and the Regulations are just one reason
why probability of detection varies from one transaction to the next and from one item on a return
to another. It is no secret that while some arrangements are obvious even to a novice auditor,
other schemes are next to impossible to find on a tax return. This disparity exists, at least in part,
because of a strategy used by auditors to detect questionable positions. To use a common
metaphor, auditors find tax avoidance by looking for red flags.134 Understanding what these red
flags are and how they help auditors in detecting tax avoidance is crucial for recognizing the
serious deficiency of the current tax enforcement regime.
Let’s start with a few examples. During the late 1970s IRS auditors noticed something
strange on returns of urban and suburban doctors, lawyers, and other white-collar professionals.
A growing number of these taxpayers were claiming large losses from farming, chinchilla
breeding, movie production, and other activities that seemed unusual and unrelated to their
lifestyle or typical investment strategies.135 Sure enough, with some investigative work the
government discovered what came to be known as the tax shelter crisis of the 1970s.
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Fast forward twenty years. IRS personnel examining returns of various U.S. companies
could not understand why more and more of them went into the leasing business (or so it
seemed). 136 When, alarmed by large lease-related deductions, the agents inquired about the
underlying transactions, things got even stranger. Why would a prominent U.S. bank, for
example, lease a transportation or a sewage system of a quaint town somewhere in Europe and
immediately lease it back to the municipality? Puzzled by this inexplicable activity, the auditors
kept asking questions until they discovered one of the most wide-spread tax avoidance schemes
of the recent past. In fact, this arrangement has become so popular that the legislative provision
eliminating any doubt (if there ever was one) that this scheme fails to deliver the intended tax
benefits is expected to raise more than $25 billion over the next 10 years according to the
Congressional budget estimates.137 As with chinchilla breeding, these so-called lease-in, leaseout deals were spotted because they resulted in deductions that stood out on returns, i.e., raised
red flags.
Another recent example suggests that taxpayers hate to raise red flags just as much as the
auditors like to focus on them. Managers of a prominent hedge fund entered into a transaction of
questionable legality that promised to reduce their taxable income by about $100 million.138
However, they understood that including a $100 million loss on Schedule M-1 would draw
unwanted attention from the IRS, so they offset the loss against other gains and reported only the
net number. The trick didn’t work. When the court considered whether to allow the loss it was
particularly annoyed by the taxpayers’ “efforts to keep the huge tax losses claimed from raising a
red audit flag.”139 In fact, taxpayers’ evasiveness may have contributed to the court’s decision to
impose penalties.140
One need not be a super-wealthy hedge fund manager to be aware of the red flags
technique. When a group of taxpayers participating in a study agreed to record their daily
thoughts related to tax return preparation, one of the participants immortalized the following
wisdom:
I was satisfied [at first] with the number [of an anticipated refund for 1987],
but looked at my 1986 tax and found out I took quite a bit higher number on
charitable contributions [in 1986] so I went back and added more on. On
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to thereby potentially win the audit lottery and evade IRS detection.”).
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certain categories like charitable contributions, it isn’t good to vary too
greatly from year to year.141
The intuition behind the focus on red flags is obvious. The government’s audit selection
formulas are imperfect. Once the audit decision is made, the IRS examiners have neither time nor
resources to understand the taxpayer’s business or personal situation in all of its minute details in
order to examine each line on the return in the most comprehensive manner.142 Thus, the
government needs strategies that would help it identify, with speed and consistency, the more
aggressive returns during audit selection and the areas where avoidance is more likely during
audits. It appears highly probable that looking for red flags is one such strategy.143 If so, what
exactly are these red flags?
With some exceptions, tax returns are compilations of lines showing “items,” not a series
of reports describing individual transactions. These items reflect taxpayer’s income, losses,
deductions, and credits in a more or less aggregate manner. The essence of a red flag can be
gleaned from the above examples. An item is likely to raise a red flag in one of two cases. First,
if only a single-year return is examined, a significant item that has no apparent relation to
taxpayer’s business or personal circumstances is likely to draw attention. If the audit involves
returns for more than one year, a red flag would appear if a given item changes dramatically from
one year to the next, or if a particular item appears on one and only one return, and there is no
ready explanation for either pattern. In sum, the more “unusual” the item is (in a sense just
described, and as this term will be used in the remainder of the article), the more likely it is to be
scrutinized on audit.144
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Decisions regarding whether an item is “significant,” whether it is sufficiently “related”
to the taxpayer’s business, whether a change is “dramatic” are imprecise and unlikely to be made
with a high degree of consistency. This is not to say, however, that these rough judgments do not
play a major role in determining how tax audits are conducted. The government has not been
eager to admit directly anything that specific.145 Audit strategies such as the audit selection
formulas are among the IRS’s most closely guarded secrets.146 The government has been
extremely reluctant to release individual return data collected through TCMP out of concern that
researches would use it to reverse-engineer audit patterns.147 In a rather odd example, the IRS
provided a small group of scholars with a detailed data on corporate noncompliance only to
withdraw the access shortly thereafter.148 In light of this extreme secrecy, one should hardly
expect clear statements in support of the red flags hypothesis from the IRS.
Evidence of taxpayers’ and courts’ beliefs that the red flags approach is widely used
during audits is admittedly sparse. However, it clearly exists, as the examples just described, as
well as other precedents, demonstrate.149 Scholars have asserted, in one form or the other, that a
chance of detecting noncompliance depends on the relationship between the size of an illegally
claimed item and the amount of the legitimate item of the same type on the return.150 Economists

76 Tax Notes 1201, 1210 (1997). An astute commentator suggested that “[t]he technical term for a return
with large income items and obvious offsetting deductions is red flag,” Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis:
Dissecting the Compensatory Option Sale Shelter, 98 Tax Notes 871, 871 (2003). For an entire list of very
specific “red flag issue[s]” on one particular return see William D. Samson, President Nixon’s Troublesome
Tax Returns, 107 Tax Notes 635 (2005). In fact, the disclosure triggers that went into foundation of the tax
shelter Regulations most likely were red flags prior to their “codification.” The difference between these
examples and the indicators developed in the text is the level of generality—the latter apply in a much
broader context.
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More typically, the suggestion is informal, see, e.g., Paul Streckfus, New Analysis: Unmasking
Corporate Sponsorship, 53 Tax Notes 1346 (1991) (reporting that the “Service has indicated informally
that [elaborate] contracts [between corporate donors and tax exempt organizations documenting alleged
gifts] are a red flag.”).
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See, e.g., Klepper & Nagin, supra note 84, at 2 (explaining that “outside of the IRS very few studies
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order to protect the confidentiality of its audit selection rules.”).
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See Rice, supra note 119, at 126, 131-132 (reporting that he was able to perform the first ever analysis
(made outside of the IRS) of the corporate noncompliance data after the IRS “graciously made available”
the data during a part of 1988, although soon thereafter “out of concern for the security of the DIF
formulas, [the government] again curtailed much of this access.”).
149

See, e.g., United States v. Neill, 964 F. Supp. 438, 452 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referring to accountant’s
fears that transfers to an offshore account would raise a “red flag” for the IRS); United States v. Fawaz, 881
F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that certain deductions may raise “a red flag inducing the IRS to
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For example, Joel Slemrod suggests that shifting income by a corporate parent to a subsidiary in a lowtax country is more likely to go unnoticed if the parent already has a subsidiary generating a significant
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model tax evasion based on an “intuitively appealing idea that, ceteris paribus, both the absolute
amount and the proportion of income concealed may matter” in detecting noncompliance.151
Some models expressly postulate that a relative size of noncompliance (i.e., the amount of
incorrectly reported item compared to its true amount) affects the likelihood that a particular line
on the return would be examined.152 Researches note that the auditors look for unusual,
“suspicious looking” items153 that appear to be “outliers.”154 Even The New York Times informs
its readers that auditors typically search for “red flags, like spikes in income.”155 There is a small
but promising empirical literature showing that taxpayers manage the risk of detection by
choosing which line items to misreport.156 Helping taxpayers to avoid red flags is part of what
some tax advisors believe to be “the highest ethical standards.”157 Red flags even became part the
tax folklore.158
A recent development further boosts the hypothesis. Because auditors decide where to
focus their efforts based on items rather than transactions, the level of tax return’s specificity is
critically important to the success of the red flags strategy. At an extreme, if a tax return

income in that country, see Slemrod, Corporate Selfishness, at 894. Presumably, this is because a slight
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appropriate to assist the client in structuring a transaction and reporting it on the return in the way least
likely to be subject to audit, provided we do not mislead the Service.”).
158

See David M. Richardson, Audit Avoidance via Intent Modification—Is Fred Corneel Onto Something . .
. Or Not?, 92 Tax Notes 277, 279 (2001) (describing a plan to avoid raising a red flag in a fictional
dialogue).

29

contained one aggregate line item showing a taxpayer’s income or loss for the year, there would
be no way to distinguish usual from unusual. The more detailed are the items required to be
shown on a return (within limits), the better the strategy works. While increasing the number of
items subject to separate reporting forces auditors to process more information, the benefits of the
additional disclosure are likely to outweigh the costs because an auditor would not study each
additional item with equal care. Rather, she would check for red flags and focus only on those
items that raise suspicions.159
The comprehensive revision of Schedule M-1 undertaken by the IRS in 2004 followed
precisely this strategy. The old form was helpful, but not detailed enough.160 The new Schedule
M-3 asks the same basic question: what are the differences in taxpayer’s tax and financial
accounting? However, the level of specificity with which taxpayers must answer the question has
risen substantially. Whereas the old Schedule M-1 had identified only eight book-tax differences,
the new Schedule M-3 highlights sixty seven!161 This is a great improvement for auditors relying
on the red flags approach. As importantly, government’s justifications for the new schedule are
entirely consistent with this hypothesis. Additional disclosure, the officials have explained, is
expected to help the government to “increase transparency”162 and identify “aggressive
transactions.”163 It will become an “examination tool”164 that would enable the IRS to “set
priorities for use of its resources”165 by “distinguish[ing] between high-risk and low-risk
returns.”166 Moreover, in a somewhat unusual display of openness, a high-ranking Treasury
official made no secret of the fact that the government plans to use Schedule M-3 as an audit
selection tool.167 In fact, the government is so convinced that a more detailed disclosure would
improve its ability to detect noncompliance that it is planning to revise other forms along the
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same lines.168 These plans are entirely consistent with the assumption that the IRS relies on red
flags during audits.
Finally, if one plunges into the depths of the voluminous materials prepared by the IRS
for its field agents and made available to the general public under the Freedom of Information
Act,169 one finds remarkably revealing evidence of the red flags approach. The agency instructs
its agents to analyze returns before contacting taxpayers in order to identify “large, unusual, or
questionable items.”170 The government even has an acronym for these items—LUQ—that, I
suspect, is pronounced “lucky”! And what are these LUQ items? They are remarkably similar to
the ones I have termed “unusual.”171 In light of this evidence, the only reason to stop short of
declaring that the red flags approach is one of the government’s main (if not the main) audit
strategies is that, in addition to focusing on LUQ items, auditors are instructed to follow multiple
other directives as well.
In sum, red flags carry a double-duty in increasing probability of detection for
transactions that raise them. First, the government is more likely to audit a return that has a red
flag. Second, once the return is audited, the unusual item is more likely to be examined with
particular care compared to other items on the return. Thus, there is every reason to believe that
the likelihood of detection for items that raise red flags is significantly higher than for those that
do not.
We can now summarize the current state of tax enforcement. The existing system
combines widely diverging probabilities of detection with largely constant nominal penalties.
First, probabilities of detection vary based on audit selection strategies. Second, for those returns
that are selected for examination, likelihood of detection is higher if a transaction falls within a
category that requires mandatory disclosure or if it is unusual and raises a red flag. In contrast,
while nominal penalties depend on the size and aggressiveness of an avoidance scheme, they vary
fairly little among different tax planning techniques. As a result, expected penalties differ
substantially from one strategy to the next.
Some of these variations are intentional. Differences in expected penalties resulting from
the mandatory disclosure rules and audit selection formulas reflect the government’s efforts to
increase deterrence in a particularly problematic area or, perhaps, to raise most revenue given the
limited funds available for enforcement. Not surprisingly, the government does not attempt to
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conceal the existence of these differences. To the contrary, the IRS makes the information public
being fully aware that taxpayers would take it into account.
In contrast, variations in probability of detection caused by the red flags approach are a
product of necessity. While this strategy may assist the government in finding some tax
avoidance, it produces variations in expected penalties that are anything but desirable from the
deterrence perspective. Perhaps, the government recognizes the problem and, therefore, is
unwilling to publicize the use of this strategy. This secrecy changes little. The decisions by the
hedge fund managers and the taxpayer in the survey described above were almost certainly
motivated by their assumptions that the IRS would be looking for red flags. If federal courts, tax
commentators, and (occasionally) even government officials refer to this strategy as a common
knowledge, the proverbial cat is probably out of the bag.172
The economic theory of deterrence suggests that taxpayers would structure their
avoidance transactions to produce the lowest expected penalties.173 Among other things, this
means that taxpayers are likely to expend considerable efforts in order to avoid raising red flags.
If so, what was identified earlier as a potential weakness in the existing penalties structure is in
fact a critical flaw. Because most taxpayers are likely to face the lowest expected penalties, the
overall deterrence is only as strong as these penalties provide. Thus, it matters little that for some
tax avoidance transactions expected penalties are fairly high because taxpayers would tend to
forego these transactions. Rather, it is critically important that for other avoidance strategies
expected penalties are exceedingly low because these are likely to be the strategies used by most
taxpayers.174
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More specifically, while some taxpayers may engage in avoidance or evasion that is
likely to trigger an audit and would be obvious once the return is examined, we should expect that
many more taxpayers would act differently. They would look for avoidance opportunities with
the lowest expected penalties, and, faced with the same nominal penalties for all opportunities
(assuming equal aggressiveness and size), they would search for the strategies with the lowest
probability of detection.175 In plain English, they would try to hide their aggressive transactions.
Inevitably, even if unintentionally, the current enforcement regime ensures that probability of
detection for transactions that do not raise red flags is particularly low. This encourages
taxpayers to conceal their avoidance, producing social waste while failing to collect revenue.
Economic analysis suggest that reducing variation in expected penalties for transactions that we
would like to deter equally would reduce the existing inefficient incentives and improve overall
deterrence.

IV. Eliminating the Flaw, Improving Deterrence
1. More of the Same?
If this analysis is correct, how can the government respond? A look at Becker’s formula
suggests several alternatives. First, the government can raise the probability of detection for all
transactions, including the “usual” ones (i.e., those transactions that do not raise red flags) by
increasing audit rates across the board. Yet, this would hardly solve the problem because even
though an overall likelihood of detecting noncompliance would increase, the taxpayers’ incentive
to conceal would remain unaffected. As long as auditors use the red flags approach, it would pay
to hide avoidance no matter how high (or low) the audit rates are. Raising generally-applicable
nominal penalties (such as those for negligence or disregard of rules and regulations) would be
similarly ineffective.
Increasing probability of detection by raising audit effectiveness holds more promise.
This strategy could go a long way toward resolving the problem because, ideally, it would make
the red flags technique unnecessary. If IRS agents have time and expertise to examine each
return item as carefully as needed, they would not need shortcuts such as the red flags strategy.
Unfortunately, dramatic improvements in audit effectiveness are unlikely. Government’s prior
limited attempts to conduct more thorough examinations highlight the potential perils clearly
enough. A relatively small number of comprehensive audits designed to provide the IRS with
critical tax compliance information caused enough outrage to shut down the program for over a
decade.176 It has been recently renewed, and the IRS has promptly come under attack from
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Congressmen eager to protect their constituencies.177 The IRS’s attempt to collect detailed
taxpayer information in order to improve the administration of the earned income tax credit
program has resulted in a law suit against the agency and plenty of scathing rhetoric from Capitol
Hill.178 By any measure, political costs of raising audit effectiveness will not be small.
Administrative costs of a meaningful increase may be even higher. Hiring and training more
examiners and extending audits will come at a steep price. In fact, current audit costs are so
significant and the budgetary constraints are so great that one of the IRS’s latest objectives is to
reduce the time spent on each audit.
In sum, resource constraints, political pressures, and the general fiscal difficulties that are
likely to persist well into the future make raising probability of detection in a meaningful way
somewhat unrealistic. Perhaps, if no other measure could be devised to resolve the problem, the
government would need to incur these costs and improve audit effectiveness. Before concluding
that this is the only viable alternative, however, we should consider whether reforming nominal
penalties other than by simply raising them across the board may offer a more cost-effective
solution.

2. New, But Not Necessarily Improved
Ideally, we would like to counter taxpayers’ attempts to hide avoidance by raising
nominal penalties for those transactions that are harder to detect. Why not do this directly? Thus,
if the IRS detects a dubious transaction during an audit and prevails in court, it could levy a
penalty whose amount would depend on how difficult it was for the government to find this
transaction in the first place. For example, if one strategy was twice as hard to catch as an
average avoidance scheme, the penalty would be 200 percent of that imposed under the current
rules. This approach would amount to the use of case-by-case multipliers analyzed in detail in
the general deterrence literature.179 Once taxpayers become aware of this regime, they would
realize that it doesn’t pay to conceal their tax avoidance.
Unfortunately, the difficulties and dangers of this proposal are both numerous and
significant. To begin with, the penalty may be so high in a given case that a court would
characterize it as a criminal rather than civil sanction.180 If it does, the penalty may be
unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto clause. Furthermore, retroactive penalties raise Due
Process concerns. Courts have been quite deferential when Congress applied higher penalties to
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Halper for its analysis).
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transactions that took place before these penalties were enacted.181 However, the opinions dealt
with fairly unusual transitional situations reflecting changes from one fixed penalty regime to
another.182 One should hardly presume that judges would be equally willing to endorse a system
where most of the penalties are set within a complete discretion of the enforcement agency as a
matter of course. Finally, a broad use of ex post penalties would fly in the face of a long standing
legislative practice against retroactive application of new tax laws, even when these laws are
aimed at shutting down abusive tax shelters.183
Doctrinal and historic considerations do not nearly exhaust the list of concerns raised by
the proposal. It would be hard to verify the government’s claims regarding the difficulty of
identifying a given arrangement because no one but the government is engaged in tax audits and
can serve to support or challenge the government’s assertions. At the same time, given the
widespread belief that the current level of enforcement is grossly insufficient, there is a danger
that the government would ask for higher penalties for those who are caught to compensate for
many cases where, it believes, it failed to identify noncompliance. Furthermore, it would be very
difficult to determine with any kind of precision how much higher a penalty in a given case
should be compared to the base line case. How would an auditor decide (and the court evaluate)
whether it was three times or four times as hard to spot a particular scheme as compared to some
average reference strategy? Note that the difference between these two multipliers amounts to
100 percent of the current sanction. It is also unclear how the base line strategy for which no
extra penalties are levied should be set. Should it depend on the type of a taxpayer and the skill
level of an auditor?184 How arbitrary would this penalty become if the answers to these questions
are “no”?
Because the stakes will be high and the uncertainty great, the amount of litigation along
the lines just described is likely to dwarf the number of controversies related to the substantive
tax issues.185 Additional costs for the taxpayers and the government would be enormous. Finally,
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an ability to drastically increase the penalty based on obscure considerations would give auditors
enormous power in their negotiations with taxpayers regarding all other disputed items on their
returns—a power that in some cases is likely to be abused. “Thousands of years of history with
corrupt tax collectors”186 provide a strong incentive to search for less uncertain measures.
These problems are hardly surprising. The suggested approach would give so much
discretion to the tax enforcement agency that on a rules-standards continuum it would go off the
chart, nearing “untrammeled discretion.”187 Yet an economic analysis of the rules/standards
choice suggests that the penalty for hiding tax noncompliance should be more rule-like.
This analysis is based on comparing the costs incurred when legal commands are
promulgated, learned, and enforced.188 The key variable is frequency. Generally, rules (i.e., ex
ante determinations of the law’s content) are costlier than standards (ex post determinations) to
promulgate, but are cheaper to learn and enforce.189 Thus, if a given command is applied
frequently (by the agents it governs as they learn it and by the enforcers who apply the
command), it would be cost-effective to promulgate this command as a rule. If, however, the
command will be used only rarely, a standard would be more efficient. The distinction between
rules and standards is reduced, although not eliminated, if application of a standard quickly leads
to creation of a rule-like precedent.190
If enacted, the penalty addressed here will be relevant for every taxpayer with respect to
each item whose treatment is at all uncertain. The IRS would be free to assert the penalty at will,
so courts are likely to face it on many occasions. Large costs of learning and applying a vague
standard in this context suggest that a rule would be preferable. This suggestion is reinforced by
the fact that the development of a precedent is unlikely. If the IRS sets the penalty based on its
internal evaluations, any justifications for imposing a particular penalty would be shielded from a
court, and no rules useful for future controversies will develop.
Nevertheless, the case for a rule-based regime is not unequivocal. While hiding
aggressive schemes is no doubt common, the economic analysis views violations as frequent only
if their specific features are similar enough to merit identical treatment.191 Thus, it would be
efficient to counter attempts to conceal tax avoidance with a rule only if the key features of many
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concealment strategies are identical (or at least very similar). The challenge, then, is to devise a
more rule-like penalty that would be sufficiently general to cover a variety of concealment
techniques, yet specific enough for the future savings to exceed the costs incurred in
promulgating the penalty. A number of approaches appear promising. The government’s
discretion may be constrained. For instance, it may be allowed to take only certain factors into
account in deciding how difficult it was to discover a particular avoidance or evasion transaction.
The IRS may be required to justify the size of the penalty to a judge.192 Perhaps, other
incremental steps may be taken to move away from the untrammeled discretion of the original
proposal.
Yet, the lure of a clear, universal, and easily-applicable rule remains strong. Is it possible
to raise the sanctions for inconspicuous avoidance on an ex ante basis and without government’s
involvement in choosing the fine in each particular case in a more or less obscure and arbitrary
fashion? That is, can the government leapfrog the taxpayers and increase expected penalties for
various types of tax avoidance without knowing what they are and without a significant increase
in enforcement costs? As unrealistic as it sounds, the following proposal takes a step toward
achieving these goals.

3. A Promising Solution
In order to reduce taxpayers’ incentives to conceal tax avoidance, we need to create a
regime in which transactions that are difficult to detect would be subject to higher nominal
penalties on an ex ante basis. Easier said than done! There are enormous variations among
taxpayers along many different dimensions. Take just one type of subtraction from gross
income—a loss—as an example. Some taxpayers are large and others are small, so a loss that
would appear significant and stand out on one return would be entirely inconspicuous on another.
Business and personal profiles of taxpayers differ. A substantial farming loss would look odd on
a suburban lawyer’s return, but not on that of a farmer. Some businesses are going through
periods of dramatic growth or contraction, others are stable. Large losses on the returns of the
former type merely reflect business realities (these are start-up losses or actual losses of a failing
enterprise). Similar losses on returns of a stable entity may indicate tax avoidance. There seems
to be nothing we can seize on to use as a measuring stick for deciding when to raise or lower
nominal penalties. Perhaps, this difficulty lies at the core of the existing system’s failure to
respond to variations in probabilities of detection.
But why do we need a measuring stick? We need it, of course, because if we were to
vary nominal penalties for transactions yet unknown, we need to refer to something that would
make each particular level of nominal penalties applicable. This is true, however, only if we
remain bound by the rigid structure of the existing nominal penalties. For these penalties, the
measuring sticks are the magnitude of avoidance, its aggressiveness, and whether or not a
transaction was disclosed on the return. Can an ex ante penalty be devised without relying on
measuring sticks?
Consider again the features that are likely to raise a red flag. Limiting the inquiry to
subtraction items (such as a deduction, credit, or loss), auditors are likely to become suspicious
about such an item if it is either atypical for a given taxpayer or it has changed significantly from
the prior year or years. Being well aware of that, a taxpayer choosing among several tax
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This, however, would have to be done in camera if the government wants to preserve the secrecy of its
examination strategies.
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avoidance strategies and looking for the one with a lower expected penalty would select a
transaction giving rise to a subtraction of a specific type, other things being equal. First, this will
be a subtraction that the taxpayer already has on her return and that has some obvious
relationship to her business or personal situation. Second, she would prefer a subtraction that she
already has in a relatively substantial amount (so that a change caused by the tax avoidance
arrangement would not be dramatic). Otherwise, a deduction or credit resulting from tax
avoidance is likely to raise a red flag.
Ideally, we would want a higher nominal penalty in case where a taxpayer has followed
this logic, but not in an alternative case where probability of detection will be relatively high. We
can advance toward this goal by linking the size of the nominal penalty not just to the amount of
the improperly claimed subtraction as we do now, but, in addition, to the amount of a legitimate
subtraction of the same type (i.e., reported on the same line) on the taxpayer’s return.193
The specific form of this linkage is open to further consideration and is discussed in
detail below. Whatever form is chosen, the critical feature of the proposed penalty, and the one
that distinguishes it from any penalty existing today, is that this linkage makes it unnecessary to
search for, and latch onto, any measuring stick. That is, the government need not decide in
advance what specific deduction or credit should be made subject to a higher nominal penalty—
something it cannot do with much precision in any case.194 Rather, each taxpayer’s own return
would provide the answer. Because the proposed penalty depends on individual circumstances of
a particular taxpayer, in many instances it would adjust itself: it would be automatically higher
where we would want it to be higher and lower where we would want it to be lower from the
marginal deterrence perspective. By raising expected penalties where they are currently at their
lowest levels, this self-adjusting penalty would significantly increase overall deterrence. An
example would help to demonstrate the point.
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Using a similar approach to deter understatements of income does not work nearly as well. Subtractions
raise suspicions when they are unusual or when they increase significantly. The apparent corollary for
income is that absence of, and drops in, income would raise questions. Neither prong of this corollary,
however, is necessarily true. While presence of, say, farm income on a doctor’s return is a bit strange,
absence of, say, gambling income on her return is hardly surprising, even though the doctor may have won
a big jackpot. Also, while, for example, drops in business income of a sole proprietor are more likely to be
investigated than increases in his profits, the opposite may be true for income of a subsidiary in a tax haven
jurisdiction. Thus, making the penalty dependent on changes in income (rather than its absolute amounts)
would not solve the problem because both increases and decreases may raise and lower probability of
detection, depending on the particular circumstances. These difficulties highlight a discontinuity in the
relation between the amount of income and the likelihood of detection that is absent in case of subtractions.
With subtractions, the larger the overstatement, the higher the risk. With income, a taxpayer may reduce
scrutiny either by understating her income by a relatively small fraction, or, in many cases, by not reporting
any income of a given type at all. For these reasons, establishing a direct and intuitive link between the
penalty and the amount of total reported income (or a change in that amount) that reflects variations in
probability of detection appears difficult while this link is available for subtraction items. Thus, the
proposed penalty is limited to avoidance (and, to a lesser extent, evasion) strategies using subtractions.
Devising innovative measures that would counter incentives to conceal items of income remains a task for
the future.
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As Joseph Bankman put it, “[r]egulations cannot [ ] target ‘next year’s’ tax shelter . . . ,” Bankman,
supra note 122, at 1788.
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Consider a corporate taxpayer, say a multinational commercial bank (we’ll call it
Interbank), choosing from two possible avoidance arrangements that, if successful, would reduce
the Interbank’s tax bill by $1 million each. Assume that the two strategies are equally (more or
less) aggressive, and that it would cost Interbank the same to pursue either one.195 The first
structure would enable Interbank to claim $1 million in foreign tax credits without bearing the
economic burden of the related foreign tax.196 An alternative arrangement would allow the bank
to take a $1M research credit without spending any of its funds on qualifying research
activities.197 Under the current penalty regime, the bank is virtually certain to choose the foreign
tax credits structure because it is much less likely to be questioned on audit. Under the proposed
regime, the calculation changes dramatically.
Assume, for example, that the proposed self-adjusting penalty (the “Penalty”) is set to
equal 10 percent of the total legitimate subtraction item reported on the same line of the return as
the illegally claimed one.198 Assume further that the taxpayer has $100 million of foreign tax
credits that are perfectly justified, but, having no research activities, it has no research credits
other than those to be generated by the scheme under consideration.199 A shelter producing
research credits would have a high probability of detection because these credits would be
unusual for Interbank. Even if they had an intuitive explanation, a change from zero to $1 million
is likely to draw attention if an auditor is looking at (or if a computer is scanning) Interbank’s
returns for multiple years. On the other hand, the Penalty in this case would be zero: the bank
would loose the entire $1 million of improperly claimed credits but nothing else.200 If the bank
chooses the foreign tax credit shelter, the probability of detection will be much lower—these are
typical subtraction items on the bank’s returns, and a difference between $100 and $101 million is
not likely to attract auditor’s attention. However, making an ex ante calculation, Interbank’s tax
director would realize that if the slight chance that the transaction would be caught materializes,
the consequences for the bank would be fairly catastrophic—it will lose $11 million of foreign
tax credits. Here, the Penalty is high, compensating for a low probability of detection. As a
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These two assumptions will apply to all further examples. For the reasons discussed in note 173 above,
these assumptions can be made without loss of generality.
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See I.R.C. § 901 (providing for a foreign tax credit).
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See I.R.C. § 41 (providing for a research credit).
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In the remainder of the article, I will continue to make this assumption except where specifically stated
otherwise.
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For an example of tax avoidance transaction using foreign tax credits, see Compaq Computer Corp. v.
Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). Research expenses have been used in tax shelters before, see, e.g.,
News Release 81-182 (Oct. 1981), and they remain a difficult and contentious issue today, see, e.g., Crystal
Tandon, Time Spent in PFA Process Has Doubled, IRS Official Says, 107 Tax Notes 294, 294 (referring to
research and development issues as “more complex issues being considered under the program.”). Despite
these real life analogies, in this example, and in all that follow, realism will not be one of my goals. Nor
should the reader assume that my repeated use the same basic fact pattern indicates that the proposed
penalty has a very narrow application. Rather, this stylized discussion aims at illustrating the points as
briefly as possible.
200

The bank may be subjected to some of the existing penalties, such as a 20 percent negligence penalty,
depending on the aggressiveness of the structure.
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result, the enticing opportunity to knock $1 million from Interbank’s tax bill without taking on
much risk is foreclosed, and the deterrence is improved.201
The proposed self-adjusting Penalty has several highly useful features. First, its size
changes without any input from the government depending on the unique attributes of each
particular taxpayer. One such attribute is the type of subtraction that is typical or atypical for a
given taxpayer’s return. For some taxpayers it is easy to hide questionable foreign tax credits, for
others it’s depreciation deductions, research credits, interest deductions, capital losses, the list
goes on and on.202 For instance, under the existing regime, a taxpayer with no foreign operations
but significant research and development expenditures would prefer the arrangement generating
research credits for the same reasons that Interbank would prefer the foreign tax credit scheme. If
the government has to choose on an ex ante basis whether to raise nominal penalties for one type
of credit or the other (assuming it is unwilling to raise nominal penalties across the board), it will
not deter both Interbank and the research-focused taxpayer no matter what it does, unless, of
course, it adopts the self-adjusting Penalty.
Another strength of the proposed Penalty is that it self-adjusts to the size of a particular
taxpayer. One of the significant weaknesses of the tax shelter Regulations is the inevitable
administrability-based decision to make the reportable transaction categories subject to numerical
thresholds. Thus, only relatively large losses and book-tax differences require disclosure.203 At
the same time, all losses and book-tax differences above the threshold must be reported.204 This
regime fails to respond to variations in expected penalties for both large and small taxpayers. For
large taxpayers, even a significant loss may be relatively inconspicuous, justifying the disclosure
burden. Yet a different type of an equally substantial loss may raise an obvious red flag, making
the disclosure mandated by the Regulations unnecessary. Similarly, a much smaller loss on a
return of a relatively small business may beg for questioning, justifying the exemption from the
reporting rules. But in other cases a loss of the same size may be hard to notice or may have an
apparent explanation making scrutiny unlikely. Yet, no disclosure obligations will arise. The
Penalty needs no thresholds because it automatically adjusts to each taxpayer’s scale. The large
taxpayer would be deterred without incurring the costs of unnecessary disclosure. The same
would be true for the small taxpayer even in the absence of any disclosure requirements.
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The idea that taxpayers who run afoul of a particular rule are penalized by losing the entire benefit
provided by that rule is a familiar one in tax law. For instance, certain trusts generally exempt from income
tax must pay tax on all of their income for the year if any portion of it is a so-called “unrelated business
taxable income,” see I.R.C. § 664(c). Not surprisingly, this provision has been denounced as “a penalty
with a draconian impact” by unfortunate taxpayers subjected to it. Newhall Unitrust v. Comm’r, 105 F.3d
482, 486 (9th Cir. 1997). A certain type of a tax-free reorganization becomes entirely taxable if a single
dollar of prohibited consideration is paid, see I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(B). A liability assumed in a tax-free
transaction that is generally taxable only to the extent it exceeds basis of the transferred assets becomes
taxable it its entirety if the transfer has a tax avoidance purpose, see I.R.C. § 357(b), (c). The difference
between all of these examples and the self-adjusting Penalty is in the Penalty’s connection to probability of
detecting the violation, a connection absent in any of the examples just described.
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The IRS makes the same point to its examiners: “[T]here are no set line items on the return that will
alert the agent to the presence of a tax shelter.” Examination Guide, supra note 171, at 62.
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See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(5), (6).
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Some particular losses described in the so-called “angel lists” are excepted, see infra, notes 304-305.
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A third attractive feature of the self-adjusting Penalty is that it works on a continuum, not
just as an on/off switch. This flexibility stands in contrast with the rigid existing rules that give
taxpayers only two choices: disclose fully or don’t disclose at all.205 The Penalty gives taxpayers
an opportunity to make marginal decisions. It creates incentives to engage in avoidance through
marginally more detectable transactions (although not the ones certain to be detected) because
these transactions are subject to lower nominal penalties (albeit not the lowest possible ones). If
taxpayers follow this strategy, audits become more effective.
For example, imagine a successful owner of a trendy New York city night spot operated
as a sole proprietorship who is choosing from three equally (more or less) aggressive and costly
opportunities to reduce her taxable income by $5,000. She may overstate her depletion
deduction,206 her advertising expenses,207 or her expenditures for chefs, waiters, and others
working at the restaurant.208 Assume that the owner’s legitimate deductions of each type are $0,
$6,000, and $60,000 respectively, and that these amounts are close to their historic averages. An
extra $5,000 (allegedly) spent on advertising will not be as surprising as an inexplicable depletion
deduction,209 but will be certainly more noticeable than a $5,000 increase in compensation
outlays. Correspondingly, the Penalty for the additional advertising deduction ($180)210 will be
higher than for taking a depletion deduction ($0) but lower than the one for overstating
compensation expenses ($1,800).
Fourth, the proposed penalty has a number of advantages over the case-by-case
multipliers and other standard-based approaches discussed in the preceding section. First, as any
rule, it would be much less costly for taxpayers to learn and for courts to apply. Second, apart
from the cost considerations, and in contrast with a standard-like sanction, the Penalty would give
taxpayers notice regarding the level of potential liability. Perhaps, they would not be in a position
to determine its exact size, but at least they would have a fairly good idea regarding the order of
its magnitude. Third, the Penalty would be less arbitrary from taxpayers’ point of view than the
standard-like sanction considered earlier. It would penalize taxpayers for using legitimate
subtraction items to camouflage the illegitimate ones by denying a portion of the legitimate item.
The connection between the penalty and the taxpayers’ actions is clear and intuitive. Fourth, the
proposed penalty would allow for no government discretion once its size is set by the legislature.
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As discussed above, the all-or-nothing approach probably means that most taxpayers disclose very little
given a choice, see supra, text accompanying notes 106-111.
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These are reported on line 12 of Part II on Schedule C, Profit or Loss from Business, Form 1040
(hereinafter “Schedule C”).
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See line 8, Schedule C.
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See line 11, Schedule C.
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These deductions are allowed in connection with oil, gas, and mineral-related operations, see I.R.C. §
611; see also Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶
24.1.1 (2004).
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The legitimate subtraction item is a $6,000 deduction; the Penalty equal to 10% of that item is $600;
assuming, for simplicity, a 30% marginal tax rate, the increase in tax liability from denial of a $600
deduction is $180. (While credits reduce taxes directly, deductions achieve the same result indirectly by
reducing taxable income. The tax benefit of a deduction is equal to its amount multiplied by the taxpayer’s
marginal tax rate.)
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Hence, it will be cheaper for the government to administer and less susceptible to abuse by
enforcement agents compared to the standard-based discretionary sanction.211
Finally, the suggested Penalty is extremely flexible. Its size can be easily varied. If the
penalty equal to 10 percent of the total legitimate subtraction item were viewed as too lenient
(harsh), it can be easily increased (reduced). The Penalty can be imposed either by default
(perhaps with a limited freedom given to the IRS to waive it), or only in some circumstances
based on taxpayer’s fault or other factors. The Penalty need not apply to all types of avoidance.
If it were thought beneficial (efficient, politically expedient, or for any other reason) to
differentiate its size and/or applicability among various types of subtractions, that could be easily
done as well. This flexibility, while attractive, would present policymakers with difficult choices.
I discuss the available alternatives and, in some cases, consider merits and demerits of choosing
various specific features in the following part. Before focusing on details, however, it is
important to acknowledge a limitation of the proposal.
The self-adjusting Penalty applies only to tax avoidance or evasion that involves
overstatements of deductions, credits, or losses. Not all tax avoidance is based on these items,
however, and most evasion does not involve subtractions at all. Starting with avoidance, hedging
and monetization transactions, for example, that were popular in mid-1990s and were targeted by
the constructive sale legislation involve arguably inappropriate non-recognition of gain.212 The
same issue arises in corporate reorganizations, partnership transactions, securities sales and many
other contexts.213 The proposed Penalty does nothing to deter these forms of avoidance. Turning
to evasion, it is well-known that although some evade by overstating subtractions,214 the most
typical form of evasion is a failure to report income. The Penalty would make no difference for
taxpayers engaged in evasion of this type. Another considerable compliance problem—
overstatement of tax basis of various capital assets215—would be similarly unaffected.
The picture is not entirely bleak, however. Subtraction overstatements play a significant
role in total tax noncompliance. The tax shelter waive of the 1970s was all about deductions. It
is revealing that many of the listed transactions subject to the new Regulations, including the
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Nonetheless, the Penalty may give auditors significant (perhaps, too significant) leverage in their
negotiations with taxpayers regarding not only the subtraction item in question, but all other items on the
return. These concerns, and the ways to limit the government’s power stemming from the self-adjusting
Penalty are discussed below, see infra, text accompanying note 251.
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See I.R.C. § 1259. For a detailed explanation of this provision, see, e.g., David M. Schizer, Frictions as
a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 Colum. L.R. 1312, 1339 (2001).
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See, e.g., David P. Hariton, How to Define “Corporate Tax Shelter”, 84 Tax Notes 883, 884-885 (1999)
(providing examples).
214

See, e.g., Wesley Elmore, Ways and Means Panel Examines Tax Fraud by Prison Inmates, 108 Tax
Notes 65, 65 (2005) (reporting revelations that inmates fraudulently claim a large amount of tax credits).
215

See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Inflated Tax Basis and the Quarter-Trillion-Dollar Revenue
Question, 106 Tax Notes 453, 453 (2005) (referring to basis overstatements as an “unpublicized problem
of crisis proportions”). While it seems possible, as a technical matter, to set the Penalty equal to a fraction
of the real (rather than overstated) basis, this would make little sense because there is no connection
between the actual basis and the likelihood that a particular taxable sale would raise a red flag. Besides, the
IRS would have seemingly insurmountable problems proving that a taxpayer used an incorrect basis in
calculating gain from sale unless it institutes an entirely new basis tracking system, see, e.g., id., at 454-57
(discussing complexity of basis rules and lack of substantiation requirement).
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majority of the most notorious ones, involve overstatements of credits, deductions, and losses.216
If the Penalty is effective in reducing these overstatements, it is likely to have a significant impact
on tax avoidance.217 While the Penalty would not solve all problems, much narrower measures,
such as the recent Regulations, are generally regarded as worth-while efforts to improve tax
enforcement.218 Thus, the Penalty’s limited reach can hardly be the reason not to give the
proposal a serious consideration. Of course, devising enforcement measures that would deter the
types of noncompliance unaffected by the proposed Penalty would be extremely useful as well.

V. Focusing on the Details
1. How Should the Penalty be Determined?
Two questions about the self-adjusting Penalty arise as soon as the proposal is
formulated. If we are to link the Penalty to the legitimate subtraction item of a type used to avoid
the tax, we need to decide exactly how this link should be accomplished. That is, how do we
define the legitimate subtraction item and what portion of that item should be denied?
To appreciate the importance of the first question, consider a multi-national automanufacturer with subsidiaries all over the globe and complicated internal financing mechanisms.
Assume that this corporation inappropriately deducted some interest paid to its foreign subsidiary.
What is the legitimate subtraction item on which the Penalty should be based? Is it the entire
interest deduction for the year, all interest paid to related parties, to foreign parties, to foreign
related parties, some other alternative? Or, on an entirely different scale, think of a plumber who
overstates his investment interest deduction. Should the Penalty be based on his entire interest
(including mortgage interest on his personal residence and business interest), only on the
investment interest component, some alternative combination?
The examples demonstrates that in order to be effective, the Penalty must be carefully
linked to the tax return. If the line items on the return are too generic (e.g., all types of interest
deductions are reported on a single line), a large increase in deduction for interest paid to a related
foreign party in the first example may register only as a slight change in the total interest
deduction, making it hard to detect. At the same time, if the overstatement is found, the penalty
would be very high if (as is likely to be the case) the automaker has many other interest
deductions. Thus, overly-generic returns would lead to very high Penalties rarely imposed. This
would be both highly unpopular219 and very costly.220 On the other hand, if returns are too
specific, auditors would be overwhelmed with information.221
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Besides, if more redistribution is desirable, and to the extent tax-avoiders tend to be predominately highincome taxpayers while evaders are mostly low-income individuals, reducing avoidance while leaving
evasion intact may be more efficient way of providing for additional redistribution than adjusting marginal
tax rates, see Kopczuk, supra note 73.
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Scholars hail these measures as “the most important step the government has taken” in its battle with tax
avoidance, see, e.g., Bankman, supra note 150, at 929.
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A regime that imposes large penalties on a small number of taxpayers is unlikely to be politically viable,
see, e.g., Dubin et al., supra note 114 at 913 (arguing that such enforcement strategy raised issues of
fundamental fairness that animated reduction of penalties in 1989).
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Rather than being a cause for concern, this discussion highlights an opportunity. By
changing the manner in which interest (or any other subtraction item) is reported the government
can tailor the Penalty (and the taxpayer’s decisions) to reflect its concerns. If the IRS is
particularly worried about overstatements of interest paid to related parties, it should add a return
line just for that interest. This would increase probability of detection for overstating this
particular deduction, and would also make the Penalty more sensitive to the size of this specific
overstatement. At the same time, the government should be careful not to over-compartmentalize
tax returns. Finally, because introduction of the Penalty would affect the government’s view
about the optimal degree of specificity in tax reporting, perhaps the Penalty should not be enacted
on a whole-sale basis. Rather, it should be “phased-in” once the IRS determines that a particular
item is reflected on a return at the appropriate level of generality.
Unfortunately, the answer to the second question—how high should the Penalty be—is
not nearly as satisfactory. Because, as discussed above, we have no means of determining the
optimal expected penalty, we simply don’t know what nominal penalties would result in efficient
deterrence. Recognizing this limitation (which applies to all tax penalties), the proposed Penalty
aims at improving marginal deterrence, i.e., it is clearly a second-best solution. But even beyond
that, while the Penalty would arguably enhance marginal deterrence, it does not attempt to
optimize it. I make no claim that once the self-adjusting Penalty is adopted, the difference in the
expected penalties for various forms of avoidance or evasion would be equal to the difference in
these strategies’ external harms. To the contrary, the proposed Penalty is virtually certain to
over- or under-deter.222 Without bringing expected penalties to their absolutely or marginally
optimal levels, the proposal is, at most, a third-best solution. However, given lack of the
economic analysis of optimal marginal deterrence, a third-best is the best we can do for now.
The more practical considerations discussed below suggest the likely constraints on the
magnitude of the self-adjusting Penalty. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that we should
not reject the Penalty just because it may be very large in some cases. Tax law has plenty of
provisions that lead to fairly disastrous consequences even though they are not always called
“penalties.” A single dollar of cash consideration converts and entirely tax-free reorganization
into a wholly taxable one.223 A foreigner who fails to file a tax return loses all of his deductions
and credits for the year.224 A fraudulent claiming of an earned income tax credit (no matter how
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See infra, text accompanying notes 278-282.
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Imagine, for instance, how would an auditor search for red flags if interest paid to/by each subsidiary (or
during each month of the year) must be reported on a separate line.
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This is so because the difference in probably of detection for any two offenses is unlikely to be exactly
the inverse of the difference in the proposed nominal Penalties, other than by chance. For example, assume
that in a modified Interbank example, the bank has $100 million of legitimate foreign tax credits and also
$10 million of legitimate research credits. The Penalty for improperly claiming $1 million in research
credits is $1 million, and it is $10 million for the foreign tax credit overstatement. It appears entirely
reasonable to assume that a change from $10 to $11 million is more likely to be questioned than a change
from $100 to $101 million, but I make no claim that probability of detection in the former case is exactly
ten times higher than in the latter one. If, for instance, it is only twice as high, increasing nominal penalty
ten-fold would be excessive. Empirical research on this subject would be welcome. As new information is
obtained, the proposed Penalty may (and should) be adjusted accordingly.
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See I.R.C. § 874(a). The same rule applies to foreign corporations, see I.R.C. §882(c).
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small in amount) is punished by denial of the credit for the following ten years.225 And how can
we forget the $10,000 a day penalty accumulating forever?226 To be sure, the Penalty would
apply in more cases than any of these sanctions (and probably all of them combined). This
generality calls for a serious deliberation in setting the Penalty’s size, not for marginalizing the
Penalty by making it immaterially small in the vast majority of cases.

2. Fault or No-Fault?
In its most basic form, the self-adjusting Penalty depends only on the amount of a
legitimate subtraction item on a taxpayer’s return. It need not take fault into account. Should it?
This question raises two separate issues. First, should the Penalty’s size vary with taxpayers’
fault, i.e., should it be fault-sensitive? Second, should the Penalty be fault-based, i.e., should it
apply, in addition to evasion, only to particularly aggressive avoidance? This section addresses
both issues.
It is not immediately apparent why the Penalty should be fault-sensitive. After all, the
existing nominal penalties already vary depending on the aggressiveness of a given transaction.
The self-adjusting penalty is designed to establish a similar variation based on differences in
probability of detection—a parameter that no current penalty addresses. As long as the proposed
penalty compliments (rather than replaces) the existing ones, why not let each penalty deal with
its own problem?
Several responses come to mind. First, by increasing the total fine, the self-adjusting
penalty reduces the sensitivity of the overall punishment to aggressiveness of taxpayers’
positions. For example, assume that a penalty is $200 for a negligent arrangement and $400 for a
grossly negligent one, i.e., it is twice as high for a more aggressive position. If we add a selfadjusting Penalty of $1,000, and assuming that probability of detection is the same for both
schemes, the total penalties will be $1,200 and $1,400 respectively. The fine for a more
egregious violation is now only about 17 percent larger than for a less offensive one. Thus, if the
Penalty is large compared to the fault-based fines, and if it does not change based on taxpayer’s
fault, taxpayers may be under-deterred from taking more egregious positions if they respond to
relative differences in total penalties (17 percent versus 100 percent) rather than their absolute
amounts ($200 in each case).
If we consider the effect of variations in the proposed Penalty (rather than its absolute
size), the problem becomes even more acute. Assume, for instance, that Interbank’s foreign tax
credit structure has a very good chance of being upheld in court, and virtually no chance of
triggering any of the current fault-based sanctions. The research credit plan is likely to be found
fraudulent, although only civil penalties will apply. Under the existing rules, the highest nominal
penalty, when added to the tax liability itself, would require Interbank to pay $1.75 million if it
loses the research credit case.227 The self-adjusting Penalty is zero because Interbank has no
other research credits. If, however, the bank chooses a much less aggressive (but also much less
detectable) foreign tax credit structure, and if the Penalty is equal to the entire legitimate
subtraction item (rather than 10 percent of it), Interbank would have to pay $101 million if the
foreign tax credit is disallowed. The two numbers are grossly disproportionate.
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See I.R.C. § 6663 (75% penalty for fraudulent understatements).
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These examples suggests that, putting theoretical questions of optimal expected penalties
aside, the existing nominal fault-based sanctions should serve as a reference point for setting the
Penalty’s size. Ultimately, the IRS would need to evaluate how difficult it is for its auditors to
detect transactions that do not raise red flags compared to those that do.228 Policymakers would
need to make a judgment comparing these difficulties with variations in taxpayers’ fault and to
set the magnitude of the Penalty based on this judgment. While the ultimate conclusion is far
from certain, if one takes the current nominal fault-based penalties as a given, it appears highly
unlikely that a difference between $1.75 million and $101 million can be justified. Rather, the
Penalty equal to a relatively small fraction of the entire legitimate subtraction item appears much
more reasonable.
Finally, in our system where taxpayers face higher penalties for more aggressive
schemes, a rational taxpayer would expend more efforts to conceal a more egregious transaction.
If so, aggressiveness and probability of detection are systematically related, and it would make
sense to reflect this relation in the structure of nominal sanctions. Fortunately, this could be
easily done. All it takes is to vary the Penalty’s size based on taxpayer’s fault. For example, the
Penalty may be set at 5 percent of the legitimate subtraction item for non-negligent arrangements,
10 percent for negligent ones, 15 percent for those that are grossly negligent and so on.
Structured this way, the Penalty would take into account variations in both probability of
detection and degree of taxpayer’s fault.
A decision to make the Penalty fault-sensitive leaves the hardest question unresolved.
Should it also be fault-based? Most importantly, should it apply to those who are merely
mistaken?229 Until this point, the Penalty has been justified as a measure that would accomplish a
very specific goal: deter taxpayers from hiding their avoidance strategies. If one conceptualized
the Penalty as punishing those who engage in deliberate concealment, applying it to mistaken
taxpayers makes no sense. A person who, for example, took a particular deduction believing that
it was entirely appropriate could not have possibly tried to hide from the government—she simply
had no reason to do this. Is there any deterrence-based justification to sanction this mistaken
individual? Put another way, what would be the deterrent effect of a no-fault self-adjusting
Penalty?
As long as the government is using the red flags audit strategy, probability of detection
for transactions that do not raise red flags is lower whether a taxpayer deliberately structured a
transaction to avoid detection or the transaction simply happened to be of an inconspicuous type.
For example, assume that a Wall Street lawyer actively involved in charitable causes takes a farm
loss under a misguided view that she is entitled to do so. The mistake is likely to trigger an audit
and be detected for the reasons already discussed. If, however, the inappropriately (and
mistakenly) taken subtraction is a charitable deduction, chances that an auditor would notice the
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Only a very rough evaluation of an order of magnitude would be required.
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A related, but separate question is whether the penalty should apply to taxpayers who knowingly entered
into a somewhat questionable transaction that was clearly non-negligent. Unlike the mistaken taxpayers,
these persons were aware that they were in a dangerous territory, but decided to proceed anyway hoping
that their position would fall on the right side of the line, even if barely. Many (although not all) of the
considerations discussed below apply to this case, and I will omit its detailed analysis to avoid further
lengthening the discussion.
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error are much lower.230 If taxpayers are more likely to make mistakes that reduce their taxes (as
opposed to those that increase them),231 this example illustrates another undesirable consequence
of the red flags strategy.
Under the current rules, the lawyer would face an identical penalty for either
overstatement. Therefore, she would have no reason to be more careful with one subtraction item
than the other. But the government would surely want her to pay particular attention to charitable
deductions because their mistaken overstatements are likely to go undetected. By extending the
Penalty to mistaken taxpayers, the government, in essence, would be warning them: be extra
careful with subtraction items of a certain kind because the auditors are unlikely to challenge your
decisions. Because the government would rely on taxpayer’s judgments with respect to these
items more than with others, and as long as taxpayers have a notice of this reliance, punishing
mistaken taxpayers would accomplish a valuable deterrence objective.232
On the other hand, introducing a fault-based threshold by applying the Penalty only to
particularly aggressive (e.g., negligent) behavior is entirely unrelated to the basic rationale of the
proposal. Imagine, for instance, that the lawyer’s accountants told her that the farm loss would be
found negligent if detected while the extra charitable deduction would probably lose, but just
barely. If the proposed Penalty applies only to negligent actions, the lawyer would certainly
choose to overstate the charitable deduction, just as she would today. At the same time, if she
already has some legitimate farm losses, yet chooses to overstate the vastly more detectable farm
loss anyway, the Penalty would apply even though she made no attempt to hide the
overstatement. Thus, introducing a negligence threshold would not affect the incentives to
conceal for a vast array of arrangements that do not meet it, and it would penalize negligent (and
more aggressive) taxpayers even if they do nothing to hide their avoidance.
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Note that simply because the lawyer makes many different donations possibly giving rise to charitable
deductions, probability that she would make a few mistakes in handling this subtraction item is relatively
high. A farm loss, on the other hand, is unusual and is likely to command special attention.
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Answering this question is difficult. It is well-known that some taxpayers overstate their tax liabilities,
and many more understate them, see, e.g., Martinez-Vazquez & Rider, supra note 87, at 59 (noting that
approximately 24% of returns correctly report taxable income, 63% understate it and 13% overstate it).
However, it is unclear whether some of those who overpay do so by mistake or as a result of taking
unnecessarily conservative positions. Similarly, it is very difficult to evaluate what portion of taxpayers
underpay their taxes by mistake, as opposed to as a result of avoidance and evasion.
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Is it reasonable to assume that taxpayers are (or should be) on notice regarding the new self-adjusting
penalty? In many cases, I suggest it is. Many taxpayers use tax preparers or tax preparation software.
Educating the preparers and software developers would be inexpensive and highly effective in putting
taxpayers on notice. Whether this assumption is warranted in case of low-income taxpayers is a more
difficult question. It may appear that many low-income taxpayers are highly unlikely to be aware of
potential penalties and statutory changes. In fact, however, a lot of these taxpayers use preparers as well,
see, e.g., Dustin Stamper, Coleman Looking to Stem Tax Shop “Abuses,” 107 Tax Notes 422, 422 (2005)
(describing the use of refund anticipation loans by low-income taxpayers who use the services of taxpreparation firms). On the other hand, some data suggests that significant subgroups of low-income
taxpayers have very little knowledge even about a program highly beneficial to them, see Elaine Maag,
Disparities in Knowledge of the EITC, 106 Tax Notes 1323, 1323 (2005). Ultimately, if low-income
taxpayers as a group are significantly less likely to be aware of the proposed penalty, they should be
exempted as long as they are merely mistaken. If the Penalty has a negligence threshold, such exemption
appears less necessary. Also, if the Penalty applies only to particular types of subtractions that are unlikely
to be used by low-income taxpayers (e.g., investment interest), the exemption becomes irrelevant.

47

These unfortunate results follow not because the Penalty in the preceding example is
made fault-dependent, but because it is made to depend on the wrong type of fault. If we want to
excuse mistaken taxpayers, we should apply the Penalty only to those who deliberately disguise
their aggressive positions. This, however, is entirely unrelated to whether these positions are
fraudulent, negligent, or barely illegal. Unfortunately, while the threshold of deliberate
concealment would reflect the penalty’s core objective, it would be very difficult to implement.
If the burden is placed on the government, how would it go about showing what taxpayer thought
when it decided to take one type of subtraction or the other? If the burden is placed on a
taxpayer, how would it prove a negative (i.e., that it did not try to hide a particular subtraction,
but just happened to take it)?
To be sure, law frequently attaches consequences to agent’s motive, intent, or purpose.233
Tax law boasts a business purpose doctrine and an economic substance test that incorporates an
inquiry into taxpayer’s motivations. These doctrines, however, produce considerable uncertainty
despite decades-long attempts to make their application more predictable. The factors that could
be relevant in deducing taxpayer’s state of mind are numerous,234 the extent of prohibited intent is
unclear,235 and as a result, transactions that the Tax Court finds so egregious as to merit penalties
end up being upheld on appeal.236 The existing tools for inferring taxpayer’s motive or intent,
however imperfect, would be of little use for discerning whether a taxpayer attempted to hide her
aggressive positions because they ask a different question. Basing the Penalty on taxpayers’
motivations in the absence of a developed analytical apparatus for evaluating intent to conceal
would lead to uncertainty of a magnitude that is difficult to justify. Thus, restricting the proposed
Penalty to particularly aggressive substantive positions appears to be a practical, albeit decidedly
suboptimal, way to limit the Penalty’s reach.
In sum, a no-fault Penalty may be justified on deterrence grounds, but only if the basic
rationale is expanded. Introducing a fault-based threshold undermines the Penalty’s core
deterrence objectives, but limits its reach. Neither solution is conceptually perfect. Thus, again,
it is worth taking more practical considerations into account.
Starting with a look at the existing long-standing sanctions, one sees a clear connection to
fault. The so-called accuracy-related penalties apply only if a taxpayer acted with a certain
degree of carelessness or understated her tax liability by a significant amount.237 Any of these
penalties, as well as the civil fraud penalty, are waived if a taxpayer had a reasonable cause to
take the questionable position (i.e., if she were sufficiently innocent).238 The recently added
penalty for understatements attributable to reportable or listed transactions, while containing no
explicit fault-based threshold, is inapplicable if a taxpayer satisfies a stronger version of the
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See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 1, at 252-53 (enumerating some of the areas).
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See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 174, at 881 (listing some of the factors).
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See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 131, at 17.
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See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 781 (5th Cir. 2001), reversing 113 T.C.
214, 223 (1999).
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See I.R.C. § 6662.
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See I.R.C. § 6664(c).
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reasonable cause exception.239 None of these penalties would apply to a taxpayer who barely
crossed the line.
In contrast, many penalties added to the Code by the 2004 Act apply regardless of
taxpayers’ fault. If a taxpayer is found to have understated her tax liability having failed to
disclose a reportable or listed transaction, no reasonable cause exception is available.240 Although
in some (perhaps many) cases listed and reportable transactions with “a significant purpose . . .
[of] the avoidance or evasion Federal income tax”241 would produce negligent understatements,
this will not always be true, as the government was recently reminded by a court.242 Thus, even if
a taxpayer barely loses the dispute she would have to pay a penalty equal to 30 percent of the
understatement if she failed to disclose the transaction.243 The no-fault character of penalties for
failure to disclose listed and reportable transactions is even clearer. The legislative history of the
2004 Act emphasizes that the penalties apply even if the underlying substantive position is
ultimately sustained.244 Because there is no reasonable cause exception, a taxpayer (or advisor)
who mistakenly failed to file a disclosure form regarding the transaction that is ultimately upheld
would be subject to sanctions.245 Thus, even though taxpayers’ fault has been traditionally a
prerequisite for imposition of penalties for tax avoidance, the recent Congressional actions
suggest that it is no longer the case.
Turning our attention from the law on the books to the realities of its application fails to
resolve the ambiguity. On the one hand, the rate at which IRS assesses penalties once it finds tax
underpayments is very low.246 If limiting the proposed Penalty to actions that are at least
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See I.R.C. § 6662A (penalty for understatement with respect to reportable transactions); I.R.C. §
6664(d) (strengthened reasonable cause exception).
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See I.R.C. § 6664(d)(2) (excluding non-disclosed transactions from the reasonable cause exception).
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I.R.C. § 6662A(b)(2)(B).
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See United States v. BDO Seidman, 2005 WL 742642 7 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“The fact that the IRS
characterizes a business or individual’s transactions as abusive and unlawful cookie cutter tax shelters does
not mean that this characterization is a proper conclusion as a matter of law. Instead, the issue of whether
BDO organized or sold tax shelters in violation of the law is a complicated question.” (internal quotations
omitted)).
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See I.R.C. § 6662A(c).
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“[T]he Committee believes that a penalty for failing to make the required disclosures, when the
imposition of such penalty is not dependent on the tax treatment of the underlying transaction ultimately
being sustained, will provide an additional incentive for taxpayers to satisfy their reporting obligations
under the new disclosure provisions.” H.R. Rep. No 108-538, at * (2004) (explaining the provisions of
I.R.C. § 6707A).
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Section 6708 containing the $10,000 per day penalty for failure to produce the list of tax shelter
participants does have a reasonable cause exception, see I.R.C. § 6708(a)(2). The exception is limited,
however. For instance, the legislative history stresses that a mistaken failure to maintain the list would “in
no event . . . be considered reasonable cause for failing to make a list available to the Secretary.” H.R.
Conf. Rep. No 108-755, at * n.273 (2004).
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For example, the rate was 4.1% of all reassessed returns in 1995, see Andreoni et al., supra note 28, at
821 (1998). Others suggest even lower rates, see Lederman, supra note 31, at 1464 n.49. To be sure,
penalties (as well as audits in general) have an indirect deterrence effect, but its size is fairly speculative.
Most agree that general deterrence effects are positive, i.e., they induce compliance by taxpayers other than
those who were actually audited. Indirect revenue raised as a result of these effects has been estimated to
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negligent means that it would apply in exceedingly few cases, we may be more inclined to make
it no-fault. On the other hand, the reason for the historically low penalty assessment rates may
not be the fault-based thresholds. Rather, the reasonable cause exception may be the culprit. In
fact, based on the latest government actions, it believes that the so-called penalty opinions
designed to ensure that taxpayers would qualify for this exception are the main reason for the
latest tax shelter crisis.247 Finally, academics and practitioners alike have suggested that the
government routinely fails to assess penalties where it is entitled to do so.248 If the self-adjusting
Penalty does not have a reasonable cause exception, and if the IRS actually applies it when it is
available, the Penalty may apply in a considerable number of cases even if it is fault-based.
Concerns about complexity and ambiguity of many tax rules and accuracy of their
application by the IRS and courts appear to point toward establishing a fault-based threshold.
The Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury regulations are notoriously difficult to understand
and interpret, making their application somewhat random. However, commentators disagree
whether randomness helps the government or the taxpayers. If, as David Weisbach suggests,
larger uncertainty regarding substantive outcomes leads to a greater range of bargaining between
taxpayers and the IRS, and if taxpayers are likely to capture most of the bargaining surplus, we
should be less worried that the Penalty will apply in many cases.249 If, however, randomness
introduces substantial risk-bearing deadweight losses for risk-averse taxpayers, limiting the
Penalty’s reach may be more efficient.250 Finally, while a Penalty for a barely illegal deduction
would appear unfair on an ex post basis, taxpayers always have an option of responding to
complexity and legal ambiguity by taking more conservative positions with respect to
subtractions potentially subject to a high Penalty.

be five times as high as the direct audit revenue, see Dubin et al., supra note 114, at 904. Others have
discovered, however, that personal knowledge of someone with difficulties with the IRS decreases
perceived probability of detection, suggesting that “increasing audit rates may actually have the perverse
effect of increasing the level of noncompliance in future years.” Steven M. Sheffrin, Robert K. Triest, Can
Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES 193, 206-07. Thus, reliance on general deterrence can hardly provide a justification for limiting the
Penalty’s reach.
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These opinions are now “disqualified” for the purposes of providing protection for understatements
arising from listed or reportable transactions, see I.R.C. § 6664(d)(3)(B). Tax advisors writing these
opinions now have to comply with new detailed rules or face disciplinary charges and fines, see 31 C.F.R.
pt. 10, § 10.35 (2005).
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See Bankman, supra note 174, at 9 (suggesting that “we might start (after a suitable warning period) to
impose penalties already on the books for noncompliance.”); Schler, supra note 111, at 368 (asserting that
taxpayers are often unconcerned about potential penalties because they believe that the IRS would
eventually settle for 100% of the tax liability without insisting on collecting fines).
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See Weisbach, supra note 11, at 107. Experimental data indirectly supports Weisbach’s view, at least
for a certain category of taxpayers, see Slemrod, supra note 35, at 477 (reporting that increased probability
of audit led to a lower reported income by high-income taxpayers, perhaps because taxpayers believed that
the ultimate outcome of the audit depends, at least in part, on their initial report).
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See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer & Joel Slemrod, Randomness in Tax Enforcement, 38 J. Pub. Econ. 17, 18
(1989) (arguing that while the cost-minimizing policy by the IRS requires as much randomness as possible,
this policy would not maximize social welfare if taxpayers are risk-averse, even if the cost savings are
rebated through tax reductions).
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Fairness considerations point in both directions. On the one hand, taxpayers who use
many different subtraction items are more likely to make a mistake than those who use only one
or two (such as a standard deduction and a child credit). Subjecting taxpayers in the former
category to a potentially high Penalty appears inequitable because their use of deductions and
credits is not tax motivated. On the other hand, these taxpayers have numerous opportunities to
overstate any of the multiple subtraction items they claim, many do so, and these overstatements
go undetected precisely because they are typical. Taxpayers taking only a standard deduction
have no similar opportunities. Currently, taxpayers of the latter type are at a distinct
disadvantage. Making the Penalty no-fault offsets this existing unfairness.
There are two additional considerations that bear on the issue. Both suggest that a faultbased threshold should be added. The first is the concern with a potential for administrative
abuse. During many audits examiners disagree with taxpayers (more or less strongly) regarding a
variety of return items. The parties usually negotiate and settle most of their disputes. Following
the enactment of the no-fault Penalty, an auditor would be able to pick a somewhat uncertain
subtraction item typical for the taxpayer’s return and threaten a very large fine unless taxpayer
cooperates on all disputed items. Facing this kind of threat, taxpayers would likely concede all
(or most) of the items, including those where the auditor’s position is mistaken, insufficiently
developed, or unjustified. In essence, this strategy would convert the self-adjusting Penalty into a
very large fine of the most general application, going well beyond its deterrence objective,
creating large risk-bearing losses, and increasing public distrust of the IRS.251
This brings us to the last argument in favor of limiting the Penalty’s reach. While the
broadly applicable Penalty would provide stronger deterrence, studies suggest that the deterrence
rationale fails to resonate with the general public.252 Even such deterrence-conscious individuals
as the upper-class students at the University of Chicago Law School did not think it was
appropriate for the government to raise nominal penalties to compensate for a relatively low
probability of detection resulting from fewer per capita tax auditors in one state compared to
another. The finding suggests that adjusting nominal penalties to compensate for variations in
probability of detection created by the government without any public justification would be
highly unpopular. At the same time, people may be much more willing to punish offenders who
deliberately conceal their offenses.253 Making the Penalty fault-based is likely to provide it with
more popular support (or less outcry) by tying it to bad behavior, even if of a wrong kind.
In sum, it would likely be a good idea to make the self-adjusting Penalty vary depending
on the aggressiveness of the underlying arrangement. Whether it would be preferable to have it
apply only to actions that cross some fault-based threshold is less clear, although that, too,
appears to be a more practicable and politically acceptable alternative. One solution would be to
introduce the Penalty with a fault-based threshold and later eliminate it if the original version of
the Penalty proves to be inadequate.
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Some taxpayers already believe that IRS would try to collect more money from them than it should, see
Kent Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in WHY PEOPLE PAY
TAXES 223, 231; Karyl Kinsey, Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of
Survey Data, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 259, 276. For a discussion of risk-bearing losses, see infra, text
accompanying notes 279-281.
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3. Additional Fine-Tuning Possibilities
Policymakers may decide that it would be desirable to vary the Penalty depending on the
nature of the benefit involved. For example, it is widely understood that depreciation deductions
(technically speaking, the accelerated cost recovery system) are both intended to be, and are,
generous subsidies rather than attempts to accurately measure economic deterioration of various
wasting assets. In contrast, foreign tax credits are merely adjustments needed to prevent doubletaxation of income earned abroad by U.S. taxpayers. Imposing (potentially large) Penalties for
the schemes designed to abuse the provisions that are already highly beneficial (depreciation
deductions) may be viewed as more justified.254 Of course, as already mentioned, nothing would
stop Congress from enacting the Penalty only with respect to a specific types of subtraction items.
Another possible reason to differentiate the magnitude of the Penalty would be to
distinguish between transactions in which income is deferred or converted into a type subject to
lower rates from those eliminating the tax altogether. Erasing income from a return produces
larger tax savings than converting its character or deferring it to future years. However, because
auditors generally review items, not transactions, they cannot easily distinguish between these
types of arrangements. For example, they would not know whether a given deduction is
permanent or would produce an offsetting income inclusion later, so the probability of detection
would not vary based on this difference.255 Assuming both deductions are inappropriately
claimed, we would want to deter the former type more than the latter. Setting a higher Penalty for
subtractions that produce permanent exclusions would improve marginal deterrence.256
A further way of fine-tuning the Penalty is to subject it to caps.257 Justifications for caps
range from theoretical to pragmatic. Conceptually, the government may decide that once
probability of detection reaches a certain (very low) level, further decreases become
inconsequential. For instance, it may make no difference to an auditor whether Interbank’s
overstatement of foreign tax credits by $1 million is added to $100 million or $500 million in
legitimate tax credits. Without a cap, a 10 percent Penalty would be $10 million in the former
case and $50 million in the latter while the probability of detecting the violation may be
essentially identical. Capping the Penalty as a fixed multiple of the illegitimately claimed
subtraction item would address the problem. Besides, a capped Penalty is likely to be more
politically acceptable and viewed as more fair (or less unfair) on an ex post basis.
An alternative (or complementary) use of caps would be to make the Penalty no-fault as a
general matter, but to cap it (perhaps at relatively low levels) for taxpayers whose actions have
not met a negligence threshold.258 If this is done, both the narrower and the broader deterrence
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penalty for fraudulent overstatement of this credit (no matter how small) is a denial of the credit for the
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objectives discussed earlier would be achieved to a degree, yet many concerns with imposing the
Penalty on mistaken taxpayers would be alleviated.
Finally, the Penalty would benefit from a safe harbor. Because of the Penalty’s very
essence, it will have a particularly significant impact on taxpayers’ core business and investment
activities. Tax shelters are frequently defined as artificially concocted schemes having no integral
relationship to the real operations of a sheltering taxpayer.259 By definition, subjecting these
schemes to high penalties cannot interfere with any legitimate business or investment. The same
is clearly not true of the self-adjusting Penalty. It threatens taxpayers with losing deductions and
credits that they have in large amounts, i.e., that are likely to arise from their ordinary activities.
A penalty affecting taxpayers’ everyday decisions may be inefficient.
First of all, this concern is not as serious as it may first appear. The Penalty would affect
the manner in which business activities are reported, not necessarily how they are actually carried
out. Moreover, even if the Penalty forces taxpayers to adjust their day-to-day operations, these
would be the operations that made business sense only as long as they generated questionable (or
illegal) deductions and losses before the Penalty was enacted. Especially if the Penalty has a
negligence threshold, these adjustments would merely ensure that taxpayers don’t violate the law
aggressively. Yet, in some instances tax treatment of real business or investment transactions
may be genuinely uncertain. Because these transactions are not tax-motivated, it would be
inefficient if taxpayers forego them out of fear of loosing their legitimate subtractions. To
eliminate this inefficiency, taxpayers should be given an option to disclose these transactions to
the IRS.260 Once a transaction is disclosed, the Penalty would not apply to it.
The discussion in this part demonstrates that the Penalty could be easily used as an
exceedingly flexible enforcement tool. At one extreme, it could be enacted as a broad sanction
applying to all subtraction items without regard to fault and with no exceptions. At the other
extreme, the government may start by promulgating the Penalty only for specific deductions or
credits viewed as particularly generous and only after the IRS confirms that the given subtraction
item is reflected on the returns at the appropriate level of generality. The Penalty would not apply
to mistakes and non-negligent violations, it would be capped, and taxpayers would be allowed to
avoid it altogether through voluntary disclosure. Perhaps, somewhere between these extreme lies
a combination that would be both politically acceptable and sufficiently robust to put a sizeable
dent in the amount of noncompliance carried out by hiding aggressive avoidance and evasion.
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To avoid the overdisclosure problem, see infra, text accompanying notes 303-306, the disclosure must
be more informative than that required under the Regulations. Rather than merely identifying the uncertain
transactions, taxpayers must tell the government exactly what they think the uncertainty is: what are the
material issues, what are the arguments pro and contra, and how strong is the taxpayer’s position (i.e.,
taxpayers must reveal the analysis that they’ve performed in deciding whether or not to go forward with the
disclosure). Armed with this information, the government should be able to evaluate the merits of
disclosed transactions and decide whether or not to contest them on audit without incurring large costs.
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VI. Addressing (Some of) the Likely Objections
1. What About Unintended Consequences?
The discussion so far has assumed that neither taxpayers nor the government will change
their behavior following the Penalty’s enactment, except that taxpayers will become more
compliant because the opportunity to reduce their tax liabilities without facing high expected
penalties will vanish. Unfortunately (but inevitably), the parties involved may respond to the
incentives created by the Penalty in less desirable ways. This section considers several such
responses and suggests potential countermeasures.261
Starting with the government, there is a reason to worry that once the Penalty is enacted,
the red flags strategy will be in jeopardy. Historically, the IRS has been focused on the largest
adjustments.262 With low nominal penalties that were rarely applied, this focus lead auditors to
look for red flags in search of the most significant tax underpayments. With the Penalty in place,
this will no longer be a clearly revenue-maximizing strategy. For instance, an auditor studying
Interbank’s return may be troubled by a $1 million research credit that has no intuitive
explanation. But it would be the $100 million foreign tax credit that would really grab her
attention. If the auditor manages to find an understatement of that subtraction item, the reward
will be huge.
From the auditor’s vantage point, this is a familiar tradeoff between a low-risk, lowreward alternative (scrutinize the research credit) and a high-stakes risky gamble (try to find a
dollar of understatement in the foreign tax credit category within the limited time available). If
the auditor is risk-averse, she would not necessarily prefer the latter strategy. However, it’s hard
to deny that at the margin the self-adjusting Penalty would skew auditors’ decisions toward
spending extra time on high-volume subtraction items.
Another perverse incentive would affect a more statistically savvy examiner. Changing
the familiar hypothetical somewhat, imagine that Interbank has $100 million in foreign tax credits
and another $100 million in research credits. However, while the foreign tax credits arise from
one gigantic payment received by the bank, the research credits come from 10 separate
transactions of equal size. Finally, assume that all eleven transaction have the same high 95
percent chance of being sustained.
The auditor’s chance of successfully disallowing the foreign tax credit are 5 percent, and
the expected payoff from focusing the audit efforts on that credit is $5 million.263 Challenging the
research credits is much more promising. To see the effect of a high Penalty, assume that it is
equal to the entire legitimate subtraction item of the relevant type. If an auditor prevails in
reversing the credit for any of the ten separate transactions, Interbank would lose the entire $100
million in research credits. The probability of that happening is a whopping 40%,264 and the
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credits.
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The probability that Interbank will succeed in defending each of the ten research credit-generating
transactions is only about 60% (0.9510 = 0.599). The auditor’s chance of success is (1-0.6) × 100% = 40%.
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auditor’s expected payoff is $40 million.265 Note that even if the foreign tax credit is fairly
questionable (say, Interbank has only 66 percent chance of prevailing on the merits), the auditor
may still focus on the research credits instead.266
These are certainly unintended results. However, the situation is not as dire as it may
first appear. Auditors operate under considerable time constraints. If an agent only has enough
time to examine one or two of the ten research credit-generating transactions, her incentive to
ignore foreign tax credits would be reduced. In addition, being aware of the Penalty, taxpayers
would start taking only more conservative positions where a large Penalty may apply. Thus,
more realistically, a chance of being sustained is likely to be higher for each of the research
credits than for the foreign tax credit.267 Assuming auditors realize this, the urge to focus on
research credits would be diminished. Finally, the auditor may take into account that taxpayers
are much more likely to contend imposition of relatively large penalties on relatively small
understatements. Thus, even though probability of detection in the example is equal for all
strategies, probability of punishment may well be higher for the foreign tax credit case, further
reducing auditor’s incentive to concentrate on research credits.
Furthermore, keeping the Penalty relatively modest and making it fault-based would
reduce the incentive to focus on large subtractions and, in particular, on those composed of
numerous individual items.268 An even better response would be to change the auditors’ focus. If
the IRS officials insist that the auditors’ goal is to collect maximum revenue from tax
underpayments without taking penalties into account, the proper incentives will be restored. If
auditors’ evaluations and promotions are made dependent on the tax (but not penalty) revenues
collected, the auditors may well pursue the red flags strategy with the renewed vigor.269
Just like the IRS examiners, taxpayers should be expected to adjust to the new penalty
regime. First, if the proposed penalty is very large, marginal deterrence may suffer. Imagine, for
instance, a highly successful self-employed management consultant who claims approximately
$100,000 of legitimate travel and entertainment (“T&E”) expenses each year.270 The consultant’s
daughter is about to get married, and he is about to spend $50,000 on this happy event. Amidst
the festive thoughts, it occurs to the consultant that, perhaps, if he invites a few clients to the
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wedding, he can justify deducting $5,000 (out of $50,000) as a business expense.271 Shortly
before the fateful day, a draconian version of the Penalty is enacted—it has no fault-based
threshold, no caps, and it equals to the entire amount of the legitimate subtraction item. Because
the consultant would now lose the entire $100,000 T&E deduction whether he overstates it by
$5,000 or $50,000, the $5,000 understatement no longer makes sense. The consultant would
either forego deducting any portion of the wedding outlays (the desirable result), or he just might
decide to write off the entire cost of the wedding. Of course, the probability of detection would
be higher if the total T&E deduction jumps from $100,000 to $150,000 compared to a virtually
unnoticeable difference between $100,000 to $105,000, but the incentive to raise the size of the
bet when faced with a huge penalty even for a relatively small violation is undeniable. The
Penalty seems to provide insufficient marginal deterrence against more serious offenses.272
Several measures would help to restore the balance. First, the larger understatement is
likely to trigger (or be subject to larger) existing fault-based penalties. Second, varying the
Penalty with the egregiousness of an offense would go a long way toward strengthening marginal
deterrence. If the consultant would lose $10,000 in legitimate T&E deductions for a $5,000
overstatement, but a $20,000 in these deductions for a $20,000 overstatement, he might think
twice before writing off the entire wedding.273
Enactment of the Penalty would eliminate some of the existing incentives in addition to
creating the new ones. One could argue that by threatening the use of deductions and credits that
were enacted by Congress to incentivize (or subsidize) a particular activity or industry the Penalty
effectively limits the intended subsidy. This is a familiar argument against a stronger tax
enforcement whatever form it takes. David Weisbach’s response seems convincing.274 The
Penalty does not affect the subsidies where they clearly apply, it only reduces their aggressive
use. If Congress intended a particular incentive to be used more broadly than the statute
unambiguously states, it should clarify the provision’s scope rather than rely on taxpayers to push
the envelope and maximize the use of a given incentive by engaging in transactions of
questionable validity.
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Finally, another likely response by taxpayers reflects the very essence of the proposal.
The Penalty would affect only taxpayers who use deductions, credits, and losses to evade or avoid
tax. While many do so today, faced with the Penalty, taxpayers would attempt to switch to the
types of noncompliance that it does not reach. This, however, will be relatively difficult to do.
So many current avoidance schemes rely on deductions, credits, and loses precisely because such
a wide variety of possible strategies present themselves. The number of ways to justify income
understatements is much more limited.275 Of course, one can always understate income without
any legal justifications. However, it appears improbable that corporate taxpayers and wealthy
individuals, i.e., those most likely engaged in tax avoidance, would shift to fraudulent evasion
potentially subject to prison sentences.276 These observations suggest that elasticity of
substituting income-understating techniques for subtraction-overstating ones may not be
particularly high. Nonetheless, facing the Penalty, taxpayers will redouble their efforts to find
avoidance mechanisms of the latter type. The government should anticipate this move and shift
attention of its auditors more toward detecting income understatements.

2. Are the Costs Worth the Benefits?
As any proposal based on the economic analysis, the Penalty must withstand a costbenefit inquiry. It does so quite well. Starting, again, with the general deterrence literature,
Becker’s original intuition that raising probability of detection is expensive while imposing
higher monetary fines is costless277 has long been disproved. Nominal penalties are not costless,
and the larger sanctions are more expensive than the smaller ones. For example, higher monetary
fines result in more vigorous resistance from offenders, longer trials, higher attorney fees, and so
on.278
In addition, larger sanctions lead to social waste of a kind that is not as readily
observable. If offenders are risk-averse, higher monetary fines result in larger risk-bearing costs.
These are deadweight losses—costs to offenders that produce no benefits to anyone else.279 To
be sure, larger penalties have a stronger deterrence effect on risk-averse potential offenders,
reducing expected penalties needed to deter a particular violation.280 However, those who decide
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to commit the offense anyway incur risk-bearing losses solely due to the possibility, but not
certainty, of being penalized.281 These losses increase with the size of nominal penalties.
Compounding the inefficiency caused by risk aversion is the fact that deadweight losses
from risk-bearing are incurred not only by offenders, but also by those whose actions remain
within the bounds of the law. Ambiguity inevitable in any legal system makes it difficult to
determine whether a given behavior falls on the “right” side of the line, making actions that do
not violate any laws risky. In addition, a possibility of a mistaken prosecution, a corrupt
administrator who abuses the system, incorrect application of a legal rule, or inadequate
assistance of counsel mean that there is a chance that penalties would be imposed on innocent
individuals.282 The higher the nominal penalties, the more worrisome they are to those who do
not commit any offenses, the larger are their risk-bearing costs resulting from legal uncertainty
and imperfect enforcement.
In sum, while costs of increasing probability of punishment are obvious and
substantial,283 scholars have identified significant, if somewhat less apparent, costs associated
with raising nominal penalties. These findings put to rest the idea that the most efficient
deterrence will be achieved by maximizing the magnitude of fines. 284 Rather, the objective is to
achieve a desired expected penalty while minimizing the sum of the costs of larger sanctions and
higher likelihood that they will be imposed.285
These insights have been incorporated in the tax compliance literature. However, the
difference between evasion and pollution discussed earlier presents yet another issue. The only
way of eliminating the harm of pollution is to eliminate the pollution itself. In contrast, because
the harm of evasion is redistributive, the government can diminish it without countering the
evasion by raising taxes or cutting spending by the amount evaded.286 Thus, when dealing with
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tax noncompliance as opposed to torts or pollution, we need to optimize the costs of at least three,
not just two, possible responses.287
Joel Slemrod and Shlomo Yitzhaki, building on earlier research, observed that any of
these responses may be carried out in many different ways.288 But whatever the government does
to marginally increase tax collections, the measure is likely to bring in less revenue than it would
have raised if no changes in the system took place on account of the reform. The marginal tax
increase resulting from the incremental reform is a private cost to taxpayers. They would react in
different ways (including evasion, avoidance, planning, and real responses) to counter the change
and reduce this cost. Because on the margin, taxpayers would expend one dollar (as a direct
outlay, utility loss, or some combination of the two) to save a dollar in additional tax,289 the
difference between the hypothetical marginal revenue assuming no taxpayer response and the
actual marginal revenue raised from the reform is a cost of that reform, or its total deadweight
loss. By comparing this deadweight loss to the marginal revenue raised reduced by the
administrative cost of raising it (i.e., by calculating what Slemrod and Yitzhaki call the “marginal
efficiency cost of funds” (MECF)) we could determine how efficient any measure is in raising
additional revenue. Thus, we can compare whether at the margin it would be more efficient to
increase penalties, raise audit rates, enhance audit effectiveness, or take any number of other steps
by calculating and comparing their respective marginal efficiency costs of funds.
The MECF model is promising. The actual and hypothetical marginal revenues may be
estimated and marginal administrative costs may be measured, giving us at least a rough value of
the deadweight loss and MECF.290 Even if these calculations are imprecise (as they will certainly
be), just knowing the magnitude of the MECF values for various measures would go a long way
toward eliminating the plainly inefficient alternatives. Clearly, the MECF model is much closer
to being of practical significance than the economic theory of optimal tax deterrence. However, it
remains to be seen when (and whether) it will be developed to the point when it can be used in
practice. Until then, it appears reasonable to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the proposed
Penalty by making qualitative comparisons to the existing ones.
These comparisons make the Penalty look quite attractive. While calculating marginal
costs of various enforcement strategies remains a task for the future, it is fairly clear today that
these costs depend on the precision of the enforcement effort. The lower the precision, the higher
the costs. Consider the administrative costs incurred by the government in raising probability of
detection across the board. Increasing audit rates for all taxpayers is very expensive, and so is
covering very broad categories of transactions by the new Regulations. On the other hand,
conducting narrowly targeted audits and requiring disclosure of only specifically defined (i.e.,
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listed as opposed to reportable) transactions is much less costly. The better the government
knows what exactly is it looking for, the cheaper it is for the government to find it.291
The correlation between the precision of the enforcement effort and its cost remains
strong if we broaden the inquiry beyond administrative costs. Audits, for example, impose
considerable compliance costs on taxpayers, both tangible (time and effort to produce records,
interact with the auditor, hire an accountant, etc.) and intangible (most of those who have been
audited report that the experience is not pleasant).292 If most of the audited taxpayers have
engaged in no avoidance or evasion, and, as a result, the government is perceived as incapable of
finding noncompliant taxpayers, these costs are largely wasted.293 The same point is true for the
compliance costs of forcing taxpayers to disclose numerous unobjectionable transactions under
the new Regulations.
This analysis applies to nominal penalties as well. Penalties produce risk-bearing losses
assuming taxpayers are risk-averse. They also lead to larger administrative costs and avoidance
costs (i.e., resources spent on planning, executing, and defending tax avoidance and evasion
strategies). It is well recognized that all of these costs increase with the size of nominal penalties.
But it is also highly likely that these costs are larger for penalties of more general application
compared to the more narrowly focused sanctions simply because the broadly applicable penalties
affect more taxpayers.
For example, recently enacted penalties for engaging in listed transactions are of little
concern to a taxpayer whose tax planning is clearly not covered by the lists. However, the same
taxpayer may be quite worried whether her tax strategies would be subject to a negligence penalty
that applies regardless of a particular technique used to reduce tax liability. If so, just as with
increasing probability of detection, it would be cost-effective to raise nominal penalties as
narrowly as possible. The problem, of course, is that achieving precision is extremely difficult in
either case because the government does not have nearly enough information about the available
tax-reduction strategies.
The self-adjusting Penalty is attractive from the cost-benefit perspective because it raises
nominal penalties (reducing the need for a costly imprecise increase in probability of detection),
and it does so in a narrowly targeted way (limiting the risk-bearing and other losses resulting
from higher imprecise nominal penalties). While taxpayers have many different items on their
returns, they would not be particularly concerned with facing the Penalty with respect to many of
these items that are present in relatively small amounts. While they would worry about large
items, this is an inevitable price of improved deterrence.
As long as the auditors use the red flags approach, the government is always more
concerned about the arrangements producing subtractions that are buried in the returns among
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large subtractions of the same type. This is so not only because these transactions are more likely
to be aggressive, although this seems to be a reasonable assumption if one believes that taxpayers
try to conceal tax avoidance. In addition, the IRS should be concerned with these transactions
because it knows in advance that the likelihood that they would be examined is small. That is,
even if the IRS could magically force taxpayers to spread their avoidance strategies evenly across
the return items, Becker’s formula would still suggest that nominal penalties should be higher for
items that are less likely to be questioned, i.e., for items that do not raise red flags. Thus, while
the imprecision of the existing penalties is caused by government’s imperfect information
regarding taxpayer’s tax structuring, the precision of the self-adjusting Penalty is based in part on
the government’s (nearly) perfect information about its own auditing strategy.294
Another way to highlight the Penalty’s cost-effectiveness would be to re-articulate the
reason underlying the red flags strategy. Auditors use it because it makes finding avoidance
easier, that is less costly. By hiding their aggressive positions, taxpayers make things difficult for
the government, i.e., they impose additional external costs. The general deterrence literature has
long recognized that offenders should be forced to internalize the costs they impose on others.295
The self-adjusting Penalty does exactly that.296 On balance, then, the Penalty’s higher riskbearing costs appear to be an entirely reasonable price to pay for improved deterrence.

3. Should We Wait a Little?
Taxpayers and their advisors are just coming to terms with the brave new world of
increased disclosure and sanctions following the enactment of the Regulations and the 2004 Act.
The Treasury Department has recently imposed new and wide-ranging requirements on any
practitioner giving tax advice related to transactions with a tax avoidance purpose. Failure to
comply with these rules may lead to monetary fines, censure, and other highly unpleasant
consequences.297 There is a wide-spread sentiment among taxpayers and their advisors that the
government has already overreacted.298 Even a high-ranking Treasury official suggested that
Congress should pause in its attempts to curb tax noncompliance and give the recent measures
time to work.299 In this environment, one (and, perhaps, the most immediate) reaction to any
proposal to strengthen tax enforcement is that the proposal is premature. Should we just wait and
see whether the measures already put in place would be sufficient? To answer this question, we
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need to consider whether these measures are likely to be effective and, if they are, whether they
would address the problem that animates the case for the self-adjusting Penalty.
No doubt, backed by the recently enacted penalties, the new disclosure rules increase
probability that a particular reportable transaction will be detected.300 For listed transactions, this
probability approximates one.301 Duties imposed on advisors involved in tax avoidance
transactions further increase probability of detection.302 In fact, this probability may now be so
high that the IRS need not use the red flags approach to examine transactions subject to the new
disclosure rules. If so, the Penalty would be in fact superfluous for these transactions.
However, policymakers should not rest on their laurels just yet. Trouble is, not all tax
avoidance is subject to the Regulations. The number of reporting triggers is limited.303 The socalled “angel lists” exclude from reporting large categories of transactions that would have been
covered by the Regulations otherwise.304 The lists were not short to begin with, and the IRS has
expanded them over time.305 Finally, the reportable transaction categories are subject to various
numerical thresholds.306
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Moreover, the share of avoidance that is outside of the government’s new disclosure net
is certain to grow. The Regulations necessarily create incentives that will reduce their
effectiveness. They give taxpayers strong motivation to shift to new tax planning strategies that
would not need to be reported. Because the reportable transaction definition reaches many taxminimizing arrangements, avoiding the Regulations would be difficult at first. However, this
difficulty is unlikely to persist. While the scope of the reportable transaction definition is broad,
the world of conceivable avoidance strategies using various subtraction items is much broader. In
fact, the Joint Committee on Taxation has already come up with a list of new categories it
believes to be characteristic of tax avoidance.307 Given time and effort—and both are certain to
be oversupplied—taxpayers will find a way around the Regulations. Of course, the government
can adjust the list of triggers, modify the thresholds, and revise the angel lists to reflect new
information. These responses, however, would be delayed, perhaps significantly, given
government’s inertia and lack of resources.
Returning to our examples, we may safely assume that the Regulations and other recent
enforcement initiatives have made a meaningful difference for Interbank and the automanufacturer. But the management consultant hoping to write off a portion of his daughter’s
wedding bill, the lawyer padding her charitable deductions, the plumber overstating his
investment interest, and the restaurateur taking an aggressive view of what counts as an
advertising or compensation expense are unlikely to be affected. They are less visible, but by no
means a less significant part of the tax compliance problem we need to solve. Besides, even
Interbank and the automaker are likely to discover structures that would give them the benefit of
various subtraction items without triggering the disclosure requirements before long. Because the
self-adjusting Penalty would affect the cost-benefit analysis of all these taxpayers, the recent
enforcement measures hardly provide a reason to delay its enactment.

VII. Conclusion
Tax noncompliance continues to be a serious problem. It is abundantly clear that
reinforcing existing measures (e.g., raising existing penalties or audit rates) holds little promise.
We need new approaches, creative thinking, and deliberate risk-taking in devising innovative
ways to strengthen tax enforcement. The government’s recent responses to the tax shelter
problem reflect this view.
Economic theory of deterrence necessarily relies on abstract models. Attempts to bring
this theory to bear on practical solutions, such as the one made in this article, highlight the
theory’s considerable indeterminacy. Until this uncertainty is resolved or substantially reduced,
we have to wait with devising first-best tax enforcement policies. At the same time, it is clear
that economic models offer numerous valuable insights for which we should find (or at least try
to find) practical applications.308 Instead of using uncertainty to justify inaction, we should rely
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on the clear implications of the deterrence theory to detect and reform the features of the current
tax administration that are definitely undesirable.
This article has identified a considerable weakness in the existing enforcement regime. A
failure to counter taxpayers’ incentives to hide their aggressive transactions induces wasteful
behavior, increases the welfare cost of noncompliance, and lowers overall deterrence. Moreover,
taxpayers’ ability to deceive the government is hardly uniform. Millions earn only income
subject to withholding or information reporting, take a standard deduction, and have no
opportunities to reduce their tax liabilities. Millions of others receive income not subject to any
monitoring regime, take numerous deductions that are unlikely to be examined, and, in some
cases, benefit from highly sophisticated and expensive advice. Taxpayers in this second category
have endless opportunities to conceal their aggressive transactions, and many take full advantage
of these opportunities. As a result, these taxpayers shift billions of dollars of the total tax burden
to those in the first group. In addition to being inefficient, this state of affairs is manifestly unfair.
The proposed self-adjusting Penalty aims at leveling the playing field. It is not a perfect
solution, it will not produce optimal marginal deterrence, and in some instances, it may appear
unfair, excessive, or flat out draconian to those who have to pay it. Yet, the Penalty will clearly
reduce the undesirable incentives to hide and raise the overall deterrence. Moreover, it will
narrow the gap in tax avoidance and evasion opportunities that can be profitably exploited by
different types of taxpayers, reducing the clear inequity that pervades our tax system today.
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